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Introduction
Volatility of stock market valuations has significantly increased over the last two decades.
The value of modern company is less and less based on physical assets, meanwhile intangible
assets: intellectual property, patents, human resources - are much more difficult to asses.
The perception of a company becomes a cornerstone of valuation and any minor corporate
news is capable to unsettle financial markets.
Managers quite often are better informed than the market and they remain the main
source of the news for outsiders. They bring information into the markets in two ways: with
the announcements and with the actions. However the executives have not a full control over
the information: part of it is produced outside. External analysts collect and scrutinize the
information from different sources and provide investors with regular reports on the business
of interest.
The aim of this research project is to discuss the information flow between managers,
analysts and investors in the financial markets. It examines the official information releases
such as quarterly earnings announcements, unofficial flows of information between managers
and analysts, and uncertain information as interpretation of managers actions, so-called
“signals”, used by analysts and investors.
The agency problem coming from informational inequality of the market participants
creates numerous opportunities for manipulations. Managers may not only withhold or
misinterpret the information, but they are also able to exercise the pressure on third-parties.
Financial analysts are not completely independent of company executives: they need to
cooperate with managers to get an access to the information and their employers prefer to
keep good relationships with the potential clients for investment banking deals. As a result
the investors constantly face the challenge how to evaluate the trustworthiness of external
information and how to extract the maximum from the news announced. The two first
chapters of this thesis discuss particular potential ways to address this challenge.
Chapter 1 adds to the existing literature on analysts’ accuracy and conflicts of interests of
informational intermediaries in financial markets by studying the problem of trustworthiness
of news produced by sell-side analysts. I investigate whether the analysts who are first to
switch from positive to negative recommendation about a company are trustworthy. Is it a
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signal of independence and professionalism or a warning signal of lack of connections with
the firm? I find that these analysts have limited access to management-provided information
and therefore are not reliable news bringers.
Chapter 2 investigates the abilities of textual analysis of earnings announcement confer-
ence calls to provide analysts and investors with valuable incremental information beyond
the facts stated by managers. It studies how the negativity of manager’s word choice, degree
of uncertainty in his speech and other textual clues may help to predict the future earnings
and likelihood of financial distress.
The agency problem hits not only investors, but the managers as well. Because the
investors aware of potential conflict of interest suspiciously scrutinize any executives’ action,
the latter lose the flexibility for the actions. As an example, an executive may abstain from
rebalancing his portfolio to avoid providing negative signals to the markets by the sale of
company’s shares. The third chapter examines the possible way to attenuate market reaction
to the negative signals. I test whether the companies with more timely and extensive coverage
are less constrained by “signaling” problem - losses in value caused by the investors’ reaction
on managers’ actions.
In the rest of this introductive part, I summarize the main questions and findings for
each chapter of the thesis.
Summary
Chapter 1: Absence of Access to Management-Provided Information as a Reason
to Issue a Sell Recommendation
In this chapter, I aim to investigate whether the analysts, that are first to alarm the
investors and issue a negative rating about a company, have a superior access to the company
information.
An analyst issuing a “Sell” risks to anger management of the company. Upset managers
are able to influence the analysts career and compensation through investment bankers; as
well as directly, challenging analysts performance by managing the stream of information
he gets. There are numerous ways available to managers to reduce information flow. Man-
agers can exclude analysts from analyst-firm meetings or refuse to answer questions from the
analyst during conference calls. And even Regulation of Fair Disclosure (FD) adopted by
Security and Exchange Comission (SEC) in 2000, cannot really prevent managers from refus-
ing to return phone calls or canceling, under some plausible excuse, prescheduled meetings
with the analyst.
To avoid conflicts with followed companies, analysts replace “Sell” with “Hold” whenever
possible. Womack (1996) finds that buy-rating issues occur 7 times more often than sell.
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Mikhail et al. (2004) discover that sell recommendations represent only 6% of their sample.
In this paper I try to understand who those analysts giving negative recommendations
are: better informed forecasters with tighter relationship with the company or those who
have no access to management-provided information. I test two hypotheses the Reasonable
Confidence hypothesis and the Nothing to Lose hypothesis.
The Reasonable Confidence hypothesis suggest that analysts issuing a “Sell” are willing
to take this risk, because they are extremely confident in their opinion. This confidence can
be explained by better-than-average previous results or by superior access to the information,
tighter relationship with the firm. The latter should also reflect in the better-than-average
forecasts. Nothing to Lose hypothesis assumes that the analysts who issue a first “Sell” about
a firm are not afraid to do it, because they had no guidance and access to information in the
first place. Since it is not possible to lose anything you do not possess, the non-cooperating
company can serve as a painless sacrifice in order to build a reputation of “independence”.
Issuing a “Sell” about a reluctant-to-provide-information firm may also serve as “Your help
or your rating” threat to other companies followed by the analyst. The last but not the least
motivation to issue a “Sell” about a company refusing to cooperate is an ordinary revenge.
The losses, analysts voluntary accept by issuing a “Sell” in revenge for being ignored, are
consistent with the experiments on negative reciprocity. Fehr and Gachter (2000) document
that many people deviate from self-interested behavior in a reciprocal manner. In this
particular case, analysts are ready to bear losses if, by doing so, they can punish the firm
which was hostile to them.
Since the management-provided information is unobservable, I use the forecast accuracy,
as a proxy for it. Thats why my main concern now is the dependence between recommen-
dation type and previous forecast accuracy. I use a panel of firms covered by analysts over
the period 1993-2007 from I/B/E/S database. I use probit model to test for dependence of
previous accuracy on the decision to issue a first “Sell”. My second test concerns the change
in analysts accuracy after he has issued a first “Sell”. I perform it with the aid of a linear
regression of a dummy for first “Sell” recommendation on change in accuracy, controlling for
change in forecasts frequency and change in age of the forecasts.
I find that issuing a first negative recommendation about a firm is negatively correlated
with the forecast accuracy of the same analyst about this firm in the previous period. This
finding supports the hypothesis that the analyst issuing a first “Sell” has a weak cooperation
with the firm being covered. I find that not only the analysts previous period performance,
but also his average forecast accuracy is inferior relative to the performance of his more-
optimistic-in-their-recommendations colleagues. However, his accuracy does not deteriorate
further. It means that the management of the covered firm does not reduce the guidance and
the information flow despite the issue of the negative recommendation. The most natural
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explanation why managers did not punish the analyst despite the predictions of Chen and
Matsumoto (2006) is because the amount of guidance has already reached the lowest limit,
by the time the negative recommendation was issued.
Chapter 2: What Do Managers Say Between The Lines?
In this project, in collaboration with Richard Zeckhauser, we apply textual analysis
techniques to conference calls transcripts to examine how past results influence the choice of
words and how future results can be forecasted with words chosen. Our aim is to analyze
what do managers talk about and whether they reveal unintentionally their true vision
about the future. We hypothesize that the choice of words during conference calls cannot
be fully explained by informational content of the conference call. It is influenced as well by
the mood of managers - their expectations about the future and internal information they
release intentionally or unintentionally.
This chapter seeks to contribute to the existing literature on several dimensions. First,
it discusses how the past results influence the managers choice of words. Second, it explores
whether there is a predictive power in what managers say. As opposed to previous research
looking into the companies future (Demers and Vega (2008)), we concentrate on operating
performance rather than financial one. While stock prices and returns are subject to percep-
tion of the public, which depends on managers speeches, real earnings should be independent
of what the markets do feel.
We collected data on S&P 500 companies earnings announcements for the period of 2002
to 2009 (appearing in the index as of 01.03.2007) and largest bankrupt companies appearing
in Chapter 11 Library in 2008- 2009. Conference calls transcripts are from Thomson Reuters;
price and returns data is from CRSP; earnings and forecasts data is from I/B/E/S.
We find that managers negativity and certainty are influenced more by earnings surprise,
than by the change in earnings over the past quarter or capital gain. We examine differences
in prepared and improvised parts of managers speeches as they might signal uncertainty,
fraud or insincerity. We observe that the differences increase when managers have to present
poor results. However, we were not able to find predictive power in these differences. We
also find that managers tend to switch the conversation from present to past responding
analysts questions when questions are more hostile. We show that negativity of managers
words unexplained by past results can serve to predict future earnings of the company. The
resulting forecasts however do not outperform consensus forecasts of financial analysts. The
most important finding is the ability of textual analysis to provide incremental information
when used concurrently with classical bankruptcy prediction model by Altman (1968). The
degree of manager’s negativity and uncertainty are as important for classificatory model, as
classical financial ratios.
viii
Chapter 3: Signaling Attenuation Effect and Sell-side Analysts
In chapter 3 I investigate the impact of analyst coverage of companies regular news on
market reaction to less expected events.
When taking decisions on company financing or constructing their own portfolios, man-
agers should take into consideration signaling problem. Access to insider information makes
every managers action a possible source of information. Ross (1977) brought up signaling
issues in capital structure decisions. Myers and Majluf (1984) build a model showing that
firms may pass up valuable investment opportunities, being constrained by signaling effect
of equity issue. Fama and Jensen (1983) discuss how insider trading provides negative signal
to the market.
I follow the research idea of Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007) who found that better coverage
improves the informational efficiency. I hypothesize that timely and active sell-side analysis
makes investors less sensitive to new information coming from other sources (besides analysts
reports). And therefore, managers are less constrained by signaling issues if they arrange
intensive sell-side coverage of the company.
Using U.S. data from 1998 through 2008 obtained from I/B/E/S, SDC Platinum, CRSP
and Thomson Financial, I find that markets react less intensively to insider sales after more
active and timely coverage of earnings announcements.
Timely analysts coverage either improves market efficiency and insider trade indeed does
not bring a news to the markets, or it makes investors believe in higher efficiency and move
their attention elsewhere. Insiders, as if they are aware of this phenomenon, are more likely
to sell their shares after earnings announcements with timely forecast revisions. The effect
persists controlling for market reaction to earnings announcement and company size and is
valid for earnings surprises with positive as with negative surprises.
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Chapter 1
Absence of Access to
Management-Provided Information as
a Reason to Issue a Sell
Recommendation
Issuing of a sell recommendation is costly for a financial analyst because of the negative
reaction of investment bankers and managers of the covered firm. This paper examines the
reasons why some analysts still issue “Sells” despite the risks involved. I find that the analysts
who issue the first sell recommendation about a firm, despite being more experienced, were
on average worse forecasters for this firm than their more optimistic colleagues. Thus, I reject
the hypothesis that the first sell recommendations are issued by better informed analysts.
I conclude instead that analysts are ready to issue a first sell recommendation when they
have not much to lose in terms of management-provided information. This hypothesis is
also supported by the fact that the issue of a first “Sell” has no negative impact on further
accuracy. This means that the management does not (can not) punish for these negative
recommendations by reducing information provided. Probably, because information supply
was already reduced to the minimum.
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1.1 Introduction
This paper aims to answer the following question: who are the analysts that issue first
negative ratings about a company. An analyst issuing a “Sell” risks angering two powerful
forces: investment bankers and management of the company. The investment bankers are
able to influence directly the analyst’s career and compensation; the management of the
company has impact on analyst’s performance by managing the stream of information. Re-
counting his experience as a stock analyst, Reingold (2007) writes “Sell ratings offer little
payoff to a Wall Street analyst. <...>If a stock falls or performs in line with the market, the
Wall Street analyst who rated that stock Hold or Neutral looks almost as good to his clients
as the one who rated it Sell. As a result, analysts didn’t have much incentive to go out on a
limb with a much riskier Sell rating, even before the banking pressure emerged”. Confirming
his own words Dan Reingold issued “Sell” only three times during his 14-year career. Em-
pirical research gives evidence that he is not alone in his opinion. Womack (1996) finds that
buy-rating issues occur 7 times more often than sell. Mikhail, Walther, and R.Willis (2004)
discover that sell recommendations represent only 6% of their sample.
Despite the lack of incentives to issue a “Sell”, there are analysts still issuing sell rec-
ommendations. Among 41,192 analysts appearing in I/B/E/S recommendations file from
1993 to 2007, 60.5% have issued a sell recommendation at least once . What makes these
analysts courageous enough to issue a “Sell” and especially a first “Sell”? Well negotiated
contract may protect analyst against investment bankers’ pressure. So I expect to see more
experienced analysts to be more prone to issue sell recommendations. The second menace to
analyst’s career is resentful management limiting his access to necessary information. There
is no contract that can protect an analyst from managers’ decision to reduce his access to
information and to refuse to guide him. Though there are numerous ways available to man-
agers to reduce information flow. Managers can exclude analysts from analyst-firm meetings
or refuse to answer questions from the analyst during conference calls. And even Regulation
of Fair Disclosure (FD) adopted by Security and Exchange Comission (SEC) in October
2000, cannot really prevent managers from refusing to return phone calls or canceling, under
some plausible excuse, prescheduled meetings with the analyst.
I suppose that an analyst can be sure that company’s management will not cut access to
information and guidance, if both already were at the minimum level. Since it is not possible
to lose anything you do not possess, the non-cooperating company can serve as a painless
sacrifice in order to build a reputation of “independence” 1 or to reach any other goals. Since
the adoption in September 2002 of NASD Rule 2711 that required security firms to disclose
1Hilary and Shon (2007) show that the market does not see sell recommendations as signs of analysts’
reliability (inversely, investors assign lower credibility to analysts who issue “Sells”), but we still do not know
if the analysts realize it.
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the fractions of recommendations that are in each category, analysts have new incentives
to issue “Sell” from time to time. Issuing a “Sell” about a reluctant-to-provide-information
firm may also serve as “Your help or your rating” threat to other companies followed by the
analyst. The last but not the least motivation to issue a “Sell” about a company refusing to
cooperate is an ordinary revenge. The losses, analysts voluntary accept by issuing a “Sell”
in revenge for being ignored, are consistent with the experiments on negative reciprocity.
Fehr and Gachter (2000) document that many people deviate from self-interested behavior
in a reciprocal manner. In this particular case, analysts are ready to bear losses if, by doing
so, they can punish the firm which was hostile to them.2)
An alternative guess why analysts issuing a “Sell” are willing to take this risk, is that
they are extremely confident in their opinion. This confidence can be explained by better-
than-average previous results or by superior access to the information. The latter should
also reflect in the better-than-average forecasts.
In this paper I try to understand who those analysts giving bold negative recommenda-
tions are: better informed forecasters or those who have no access to management-provided
information. Since the management-provided information is unobservable, I use the forecast
accuracy, as a proxy for it. That’s why my main concern now is the dependence between
recommendation type and previous forecast accuracy.
In my analysis I distinguish 3 types of recommendations: positive recommendations (both
kinds of buy and neutral), first sell recommendations (I do not make difference between
strong sell and moderate sell) and the “Sell”- followers. I call the sell recommendation
“first” if there were no other valid negative recommendations at the moment of its issue.
A recommendation about a firm is valid until its author issues another recommendation for
the same firm or a 6-month period expires3. Otherwise, the sell recommendation is called
“Sell”-follower. The reasons for such a separation between leaders and followers are the
following. First, the one who issues a first “Sell” risks more as his recommendation is more
visible. Second, the “Sell”-follower may be issued as a reaction on the previously issued
negative recommendation. In my sample the first “Sells” represent 5.9% of the total sample
size; the “Sell”-followers represent 4.5%.4 To exclude the effect of herding behavior I study
2An example of negative reciprocity is found in ultimatum bargaining experiments. In these experiments,
two players have to agree on the division of a sum of money. One player (the Proposer) proposes a division
and the other player (the Responder) can either accept the division, in which case the proposal is imple-
mented, or reject the division, in which case both players receive nothing. It has been shown in numerous
experiments that if the Proposer offers less than 30% of the money, the Responder rejects the proposal with
high probability – even if by doing so he is clearly worse off (Fehr and Gachter (2000)
3I choose six-month upper limit for recommendation validity consistent with Womack (1996) findings
that analyst recommendations retain investment value for up to six months.
4Such a high percentage of sell recommendations in my sample (total 10.4%) is due to the fact that I
exclude the firm-quarters with only one kind of recommendations (only positive or only negatives). Thus, I
exclude numerous firm-quarters without any sell recommendations.
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only first “Sells” and then check if my results also hold for the “Sell”-followers.
I use a panel of firms covered by analysts over the period 1993-2007 from I/B/E/S
database. I use probit model to test for dependence of previous accuracy on the decision to
issue a first “Sell”. My second test concerns the change in analyst’s accuracy after he has
issued a first “Sell”. I perform it with the aid of a linear regression of a dummy for first
“Sell” recommendation on change in accuracy, controlling for change in forecasts’ frequency
and change in age of the forecasts.
I find that issuing a first negative recommendation about a firm is negatively correlated
with the forecast accuracy of the same analyst about this firm in the previous period. This
finding supports the hypothesis that the analyst issuing a first “Sell” has a weak cooperation
with the firm being covered. I find that not only the analyst’s previous period performance,
but also his average forecast accuracy is inferior relative to the performance of his more-
optimistic-in-their-recommendations colleagues. However, his accuracy does not deteriorate
further. It means that the management of the covered firm does not reduce the guidance and
the information flow despite the issue of the negative recommendation. The most natural
explanation why managers do not punish the analyst despite the predictions of Chen and
Matsumoto (2006), is because the amount of guidance has already reached the lowest limit,
by the time the negative recommendation was issued.
Studying “Sell”-followers recommendations, I find that their authors have on average
less experience. Meanwhile, prior the issue of a negative recommendation, they are not less
accurate than their colleagues issuing “Buy” and “Neutral”. Their forecast performance,
however, tends to worsen after the negative recommendation has been issued. This is con-
sistent with Chen and Matsumoto (2006) findings and can be considered as a consequence
of the reduction of management-provided information.
The paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 discusses the previous literature, section 1.3
develops the main working hypotheses and the corresponding empirical strategies, section
1.4 briefly describes the data and presents the main empirical results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature review
The economic literature describes many reasons for optimistic bias in financial analysts’
recommendations: career concerns (Hong and Kubik (2003a) ); investment banking pres-
sure (Michaely and Womack (1999)); or fear of management’s discontent. The anecdotal
evidences of how analysts are“punished” by covered companies due to negative report are
numerous on the pages of Wall Street Journal and Business Week (Siconolfi (1995) Siconolfi
(1995), Angwin and Peers (2001), Elstrom (2001), Kelly (2003), Solomon and Frank (2003)).
Note, that some of this evidence reflects what was happening after ratification of the Regu-
4
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lation Fair Disclosure (FD).
Chen and Matsumoto (2006) provide empirical evidence of revenge-by-silence, practiced
by firms’ managers. They deal with unfavorable recommendations, examining the changes
in forecast accuracy before and after the unfavorable recommendation issue. Chen and
Matsumoto (2006) find that issuing an unfavorable recommendation causes a decrease in the
accuracy, which they explain by the decrease in management-provided information. They use
two methods to define an unfavorable recommendation: the first is based on the change in an
analyst’s recommendation, the second is based on the relation of analyst’s recommendation
to the consensus (average) recommendation. As a result, in their sample of unfavorable
recommendations there are not only sell ratings but also “Hold” and “Accumulate” if they
represent a downgrade of the analyst’s opinion or are more pessimistic than the consensus
recommendation.
Lang and Lundholm (1996) as well as Bowen, Devis, and Matsumoto (2002) show that
analysts generally benefit from managerial disclosures with increased forecast accuracy. So,
it’s not surprising that analysts willing to keep their access to important management-
provided information avoid sell recommendations Francis and Philbrick (1993a)).
What is pushing an analyst to issue a “Sell” remains unclear. Hilary and Shon (2007)
suppose that the incentive may be the desire to look more independent in the eyes of market
participants. They also prove that “Sell” recommendations do not add credibility to the
analyst.
1.3 Hypotheses and Methodology
In this paper I concentrate my attention mainly on first “Sells”5 for several reasons. First,
analysts issuing “Sell” after some “Sells” were already issued, risk less. Second, the issue of
a follower- “Sell” can be a result of herding behaviour.
I see three possibilities to explain what makes analysts courageous enough to issue a first
sell recommendation.
• Hypothesis H1(“Nothing to lose” hypothesis)
The analyst issuing the first sell recommendation about a firm had no help or guidance
from the firm’s management.
• Hypothesis H2 (“Anticipated knowledge” hypothesis)
5I remind to the reader that I call the sell recommendation “first” or “non-preceded” if there were no
other valid negative recommendations at the moment of its issue. A recommendation about a firm is valid
until its author issues another recommendation for the same firm or a 6-month period expires. Otherwise,
the sell recommendation is called “Sell”-follower.
5
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The analyst issuing the first “Sell” has a better access to the information (learns bad
news earlier than his colleagues).
• Hypothesis H3 (“Winner’s pride” hypothesis)
The analyst issuing a first “Sell” is more self-confident due to his historical superior
relative forecast accuracy.
Note that hypotheses H2 and H3 both suppose the superior forecast accuracy of the
analyst prior to his first-“Sell” issue.
To test which of hypotheses above holds, I rely on the following two assumptions con-
firmed by previous literature.
• Assumption A1: Company-provided information is an important asset increasing the
forecast accuracy of an analysts. (Lang and Lundholm (1996), Bowen, Devis, and
Matsumoto (2002))
• Assumption A2: Managers unhappy about the coverage usually reduce information
provided to unfavorable analyst. (Chen and Matsumoto (2006))
A1 translates in that analysts who have no help from the management should have rel-
atively poor forecast accuracy. If the company-provided information increases the forecast
accuracy, the low relative accuracy may be interpreted as a lack of this information. There-
fore, I can choose between H1 on the one side and H2 with H3 on the other side by testing
if the analysts issuing a first “Sell” had a superior performance in the periods preceding to
the “Sell” issue.
To compute the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst, I consider the last forecast issued
by each analyst prior to the company’s earnings announcement. I compute the Absolute
Forecast Error (AFE) of the analyst i for the firm j in the quarter t as the absolute value
of the difference between the last forecast and the actual value.
AFEijt = |Actualjt − Forecastijt| , (1.1)
where Actual jt stays for the actual earnings of the firm j at the quarter t,
and Forecast ijt is the last earnings forecast of the analyst i for the firm j in the quarter t.
The forecast accuracy strongly depends on the firm and quarter characteristics. Thus,
to be able to compare the analysts’ forecast accuracy in different periods for different firms,
I need to define a Relative Forecast Accuracy (further Accuracy) measure. I use the scaling
method described by Clement and Tse (2005):
Accuracyijt =
maxk(AFEkjt)− AFEijt
maxk(AFEkjt)−mink(AFEkjt) (1.2)
6
CHAPTER 1
Note that Accuracyijt is simply a scaled version of AFEijt. It is normalized to take values
in the interval from 0 to 1. The higher the Absolute Forecast Error is, the lower is the
Accuracy. Accuracyijt = 1 corresponds to the best forecast, Accuracyijt = 0 corresponds to
the worse forecast.
In section 1.5 I make a robustness check using other measures for relative accuracy,
suggested in Clement (1999).
In the regressions below I use several control variables such as broker size, age of forecast,
analyst’s experience etc. These variables are shown to strongly affect the accuracy of financial
analyst and can also influence the inclination of an analyst to issue a first-“Sell”. It is
convenient to work with relative quantities rather than with absolute ones. I perform the
normalization of all the control variables used in an exactly identical manner by the following
formula:
Control V ariableijt =
Raw V ariableijt −mink(Raw V ariablekjt)
maxk(Raw V ariablekjt)−mink(Raw V ariablekjt) (1.3)
Here Control V ariableijt is the control variable used in the regressions below which
corresponds to the underlying raw variable. I define the underlying raw variables in Tables
1.1 and 1.6.
[Table 1.1 insert here]
[Table 1.6 insert here]
The indexes ijt here means the analyst i, the firm j and the quarter t, as before.
I introduce two dummy variables:
1. First Sellijt equals 1 if an analyst i issues a sell recommendation about a firm j in a
period t which is not preceded by other valid negative recommendations, 0 otherwise;
2. Follower Sellijt equals 1 if an analyst i issues a sell recommendation about a firm j
in the period t which is preceded by some other one, 0 otherwise.
To choose between H1 on the one side and H2 with H3 on the other side I test how the
issuance of the negative recommendation in period t is related to the analyst’s accuracy in
the preceding period t− 1. If the latter is negatively correlated with the former I reject H2
with H3 and H1 remains. If the latter is positively correlated I reject H1. Formally, I use
probit regression, explaining First Sell at time t by Accuracy at time t− 1 controlling for
analyst characteristics at time t:
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y∗ = const+ β × Accuracyij(t−1) +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariableijtn + εijt
y = 1[y∗ > 0]
P (y = 1|Accuracyij(t−1), Control V ariableijtn) =
= P (y∗ > 0|Accuracyij(t−1), Control V ariableijtn) =
= Φ(const+ β × Accuracyij(t−1) +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariableijtn) (1.4)
where First Sellijt is a dummy variable characterizing the type of the recommendation,
Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,
Accuracyij(t−1) is a relative forecast accuracy,
β and γn are corresponding regression coefficients,
Control V ariableijtn are N control variables obtained by scaling the variables from Table 1.1,
εijt is an error term, that by assumption has a standard normal distribution and is independent
of explanatory variables.
H1 predicts β < 0, H2 and H3 predict β > 0
It is possible that analysts issue bold sell recommendation because they base their opinion
on erroneous forecast. To exclude this effect I provide another test for dependence between
the kind of the recommendation and the previous analyst’s performance, taking as a measure
of past performance average forecast accuracy of an analyst. I compute Average Accuracy
of an analyst i for the firm j as an average of his accuracy in every period preceding the
moment of the recommendation issue.
Average Accuracyijt =
∑T
τ=1Accuracyijτ
T
, (1.5)
where T = t− 1
Besides the change of previous accuracy measure the regression model remains the same
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as equation 1.4.
y∗ = const+ β × Average Accuracyijt +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariableijtn + εijt
y = 1[y∗ > 0]
P (y = 1|Average Accuracyij(t−1), Control V ariableijtn) =
= P (y∗ > 0|Average Accuracyij(t−1), Control V ariableijtn) =
= Φ(const+ β × Average Accuracyij(t−1) +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariableijtn) (1.6)
The assumption A2 provides me a second way to test if H1 holds. A2 asserts that if the
analyst has had some help from the company’s management, he would lose it with a high
probability as a result of his bold negative recommendation. At the same time, if the quality
of the forecasts issued after the first “Sell” issue does not deteriorate, we can say that the
amount of company-provided information before and after the first-“Sell” remains the same.
The only situation when these two statements can be true simultaneously is when the analyst
did not have much information about the company even before he issued a first-“Sell”. This
is exactly what the hypotheses H1 states. Therefore to confirm H1 is sufficient to check that
the change of the analyst’s accuracy between the quarter t − 1 and t + 1 is not correlated
with the recommendation the analyst issues at the period t. To check this I use the following
regression:
∆Accuracyijt = const+β1×First Sellijt +β2×∆Ageijt +β3×∆Frequencyijt + εijt (1.7)
where ∆Accuracyij = Accuracyij(t+1) −Accuracyij(t−1),
Frequency is the number of the forecasts issued by an analyst for the firm during the quarter
of concern;
Age (age of the forecast) is the number of days between the forecast issue and the earnings-
announcement date.
∆Ageijt = Ageij(t+1) −Ageij(t−1),
∆Frequencyijt = Frequencyij(t+1) − Frequencyij(t−1),
const is a regression intercept,
βn are corresponding regression coefficients,
εijt is the regression residual.
To extend my analysis to the follower-sell recommendations, I exclude the first sell rec-
ommendations from my sample and run regressions similar to (1.4), (1.6) and (1.7), replacing
First Sell variable by Follower Sell.
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1.4 Data and Empirical results
1.4.1 Data
My primary data source is Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). This database
has a strong advantage over other commonly used databases (First Call and Zacks), as it
includes all of the major brokerage houses and provides a unique code for each analyst.6
This allows me to track the forecasts and recommendations issued by the same analyst
in different periods. Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2008) have put the reliability of
I/B/E/S database under the question. They have discovered that the data from the same
time period changes from one download to another due to alterations, deletions, additions
and anonymizations of records. In response to this working paper, Thomson Financial has
attempted to purge the 2007 and later versions of I/B/E/S databases of the data errors that
existed in earlier versions. Given that Thomson Financial has for the most part purged its
data of the problems documented by Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2008) and that I
have downloaded my dataset in February 2008, I may hope that my research would not be
biased due to Thomson Financial “processing errors”.
The I/B/E/S investment recommendation database starts in October 1993, and includes
both brokerage house-specific recommendations and standardized I/B/E/S recommenda-
tions. The standardized I/B/E/S recommendations are integer ratings from 1 through 5,
corresponding to ”strong buy”, ”buy”, ”hold”, ”underperform” and ”sell”.
My initial sample consists of all firms listed in I/B/E/S files from 1993 to 2007. For this
period I have data on 1,561,063 issued recommendations (among them 135,141 recommen-
dations given by anonymous analysts) and 1,581,632 quarter forecasts (among them 13,941
forecasts given by anonymous analysts).
I filter my dataset in order to fulfill the following requirements:
• Actual earnings, analyst and broker identification codes should be available.
• Earnings announcement date should be within SEC filing requirements defined as 48
days from the end of the fiscal quarter for quarters one to three and 93 days for the
fourth quarter.7
• Both kind of analysts (issuing and not issuing a “Sell) should be present for the firm-
quarter j, t. This requirement is necessary because of my choice of accuracy measure.
6Zacks does not include large houses such as Merill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and DLJ. First Call does not
identify individual analysts, which precludes tracking the analysts and merging the earnings forecast and
investment recommendation databases.
7SEC filings are due 45 days after the end of the quarter for fiscal quarters 1-3 and 90 days for quarter 4.
I add 3 more days following Chen and Matsumoto (2006) who adjusted this period for weekends/holidays.
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If we consider the periods with only buy (or only sell) recommendations, we will assign
all accuracies from 0 to 1 to the recommendations of same kind. The periods with
both kinds of recommendations are of interest because they allow us to range accuracy
of analysts giving sell recommendations among accuracy of analysts recommending
”Buy”.
I drop the top 1% and bottom 1% forecast errors to avoid the influence of extreme outliers.
I identify the analysts who issue a first “Sell”recommendation in quarter t and has issued
the quarterly forecast in the prior quarters.
For the last forecast of each analyst issued prior to earnings announcement in each pe-
riod I compute the absolute forecast error using (1.1). Then I compute the relative forecast
accuracy for each analyst-firm-quarter dimension using (1.2). I compute Accuracyijt for the
analyst i, firm j, and quarter t only if there are at least three different analysts forecasting for
this firm in this quarter. I compute Average Accuracyijt for all quarters preceding the rec-
ommendation issue. The average number of quarters used to compute Average Accuracyijt
is 9.5.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the whole sample of observations.
[Table 3.1 insert here]
1.4.2 Previous accuracy test
To test whether the analysts issuing first “Sell” are more accurate prior to the recommen-
dation issue, I run the regressions (1.4) and (1.6). Table 1.3 presents the results obtained.
[Table 1.3 insert here]
The results in the 1.3 show that the analysts are more disposed to give a negative first
rating when they have lower forecast accuracy in the past. This allows me to reject H2 and
H3.
The H1 is supported by the significance of negative coefficients atAccuracy andAverage Accuracy
variables. Other significant coefficients (at variables analyst′s experience and analyst′s workload)
are positive as I expected under H1. Higher workload may explain why the analyst has a
weak interaction with every single company management. The higher experience provides
additional safety to the analyst: experienced analysts are able to better negotiate their
contracts, protecting themselves from investment bankers’ pressure.
I check if my analysis can be expanded for all negative recommendations. I exclude the
first sell recommendations from my database and compare the accuracy of analysts with
negative and non-negative recommendations. Table 1.4 presents the results.
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[Table 1.4 insert here]
I find that the only analyst’s characteristic pushing an analyst to issue a follower-“Sell”
is his low relative experience. There is no connection between the issue by an analyst of a
follower-“Sell” and his previous forecast accuracy. So analysts who issue “Sell” about a firm
with already published negative rating do not differ in term of their accuracy from analyst
issuing “Hold” or “Buy”. This result is predictable if we suppose that issue of follower-
“Sell” represents only minor risks for analysts comparable with first-“Sell” issue. In cases of
particularly poor stock performance any analyst may issue a “Sell”, just those who are not
willing to take the risk will wait to be preceded by others.
1.4.3 Change in accuracy test
To carry out another test of H1 I look if the relative accuracy of the analyst drops after
his first “Sell” issue. Formally, I test the hypothesis that β coefficient at First Sell dummy
in the regression (1.7) is different from 0. I present the results in Table 1.5.
[Table 1.5 insert here]
The p-Value of 0.462 on First Sell variable means that the regression coefficient is
not significantly different from 0 at any conventional level of significance. So there is no
dependence between the fact of issuing a first sell recommendation and a change in forecast
accuracy. I interpret this as an absence of the informational punishment for the issuance of
the first negative recommendation.
Meanwhile, the coefficient on Follower Sell variable is significant at 3% level of signifi-
cance. The issue of a follower-“Sell” has a negative impact on future forecast accuracy. No
theory explains why the managers are less angry with the first negative recommendations
issuers than following ones. Probably, they are not. Likely, they are just unable to use
their standard “punishment” with respect to these analysts, because there is no guidance to
reduce.
1.4.4 Present and future accuracy
The knowledge, that an analyst issuing first-“Sell” is on average less precise than other
analysts in the period before the recommendation was issued, has little practical value - we
do not need a tool to predict the past. What can be really interesting for investor is to
know to what extend he can rely on the forecast issued simultaneously with or after the
first-“Sell”.
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Based on the my above results, I conclude that firm’s management did not collaborate
with the analyst who issues a first-“Sell” before the recommendation was issued. It should
be still the case in the period of recommendation issue. If it is true, forecasts, issued in
the same period as a first sell recommendation, should be also less accurate comparing to
forecasts of other analysts. I test this prediction with the aid of regression (1.8). Regression
(1.9) tests if the accuracy in the next period after the first-“Sell” issue is still relatively low.
Accuracyijt = const+ β × First Sellijt +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariablesijt + εijt (1.8)
Accuracyij(t+1) = const+ β × First Sellijt +
N∑
n=1
γn × Control V ariablesij(t+1) + εijt (1.9)
Control variables I use for these regressions will differ from previous one. I include two
factors hardly influencing relative forecast accuracy: forecast’s age and frequency of forecasts.
Table 1.6 displays control variables used for the model.
Table 1.7 presents the results.
[Table 1.7 insert here]
The knowledge, that analysts issuing a first “Sell” have less management-provided infor-
mation than their colleagues and, therefore are less accurate, can help us make corrections
while considering their forecasts issued simultaneously with the rating.
1.5 Robustness checks and additional tests
For robustness check I use a second relative accuracy measure, following the methodol-
ogy offered by Clement (1999) Clement (1999). Proportional mean absolute forecast error
(PMAFE): measured as the difference between the absolute forecast error of analyst i fore-
casting firm j ’s earnings for the quarter t and the average absolute forecast error across all
analyst forecasts of firm j ’s quartert earnings, expressed as a fraction of the average absolute
forecast error across all analyst forecasts of firm j ’s quartert earnings.
Accuracyijt =
DAFEijt
AFEjt
where DAFEijt = AFEijt − AFEjt
AFEijt is the absolute forecast error for analyst i’s forecast of firm j for quarter t, and AFEjt
is the mean absolute forecast error for firm j for year t.
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Table 1.8 presents the results obtained.
[Table 1.8 insert here]
1.6 Conclusion
This paper presents an evidence that the analysts issuing the first sell recommendations
about a firm were on average less precise in their forecasts about this firm before the“Sell”
was issued. I also provide evidence that the forecast accuracy of the analysts who issue
a first sell recommendation does not decrease in response to the negative recommendation
issue. This finding suggests that they do not experience the reduction of management-
provided information as the result of their negative recommendations. As previous empirical
studies have discovered (Chen and Matsumoto (2006)) managers tend to punish analysts for
unpleasant ratings by decreasing the amount of information provided. But such a punishment
is not possible if managers have already reduced his cooperation with an analyst to the
minimum. This explain why managers do not “punish” analysts who issue a first “Sell” and
also clarify why such analysts have no fear to step over the safe neutral line. I conclude that
an issue of a first “Sell” is a sign of a weak cooperation between the management and the
analyst in the first place. This information can help investors considering a forecast, issued
by an analyst simultaneously (in the same period) with a first sell recommendation.
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Table 1.1: Control Variables: Analyst Characteristics
The table displays control variables, which explain the event of the first “Sell” issue.
Control variable Definition / Computa-
tion
Expected sign of
the corresponding
regression coeffi-
cient
Comment
Analysts experi-
ence
The number of years
the analyst is present
in I/B/E/S files before
the period of interest
positive Experienced analysts
should be better pro-
tected against the
pressure from the
investment bankers.
They have less need to
sustain management
access. And they are
more disposed to issue
a bold opinion.
Analyst’s firm-
specific experi-
ence
The number of years
the analyst issues fore-
casts on the firm prior
the quarter of interest
positive under H2
or H3
The longer an analyst
follows a firm, the bet-
ter he should be in-
formed about its cur-
rent state.
Broker size The number of ana-
lysts working for the
broker in the period of
interest
positive Larger brokers have
superior resources.
Analysts employed
by larger brokers are
not so much depen-
dent on firm-provided
information.
Analyst’s work-
load
The number of firms
the analyst is follow-
ing during the current
quarter
positive under H1 Analyst who follows
larger number of
companies may have
less tight relationship
with each particular
company.
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Table 1.3: Past Forecasts Accuracy and the First-“Sell” Issue
This table presents the results of probit regressions. The dependent variable is First Sell, a dummy
variables equal 1 for a first sell recommendation, 0 for all other recommendations. First regression
tests whether the decision to issue first “Sell” depends on the previous period accuracy. Second
regression uses past average accuracy as explaining variable.
P (First Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β ×Accuracyij(t−1)
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
P (First Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β ×Average Accuracyijt
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
Relative Forecast Accuracy is an absolute forecast error of the last forecast of the analyst i for the
firm j before earnings announcement after the quarter t, scaled using the following formula.
Accuracyijt =
maxk(AFEkjt)−AFEijt
maxk(AFEkjt)−mink(AFEkjt)
Analyst characteristics, all scaled to range from 0 to 1 within each firm-quarter, are
Analysts experience - the number of years the analyst is present in I/B/E/S files;
Analyst′s firm specific experience - the number of years the analyst issues forecasts on the
firm prior the quarter of interest; Broker size - the number of analysts working for the broker;
Analyst′s workload - the number of the firms the analyst is following during this quarter.
Z-statistics are in parentheses.
By the stars, I denote a significance level of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
Accuracy -0.075*** -0.007
(-4.15)
Average accuracy -0.132*** -0.013
(-4.73)
Broker size -0.013 -0.001 -0.015 -0.002
(-0.83) (-0.97)
Analyst’s workload 0.070*** 0.007 0.071*** 0.007
(4.38) (4.43)
Analyst’s firm experience 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.001
(0.37) (0.41)
Analyst’s general experience 0.144*** 0.014 0.139*** 0.014
(7.98) (7.79)
Constant -1.731*** -1.699***
(-100.33) (-81.17)
N 106313 108078
Pseudo R2 0.0039 0.0039
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 1.4: Past Forecasts Accuracy and Follower-Sell Issue
This table presents the results of probit regressions. The dependent variable is Follower Sell, a
dummy variables equal 1 for a follower-sell recommendation, 0 for non-negative recommendations.
First-“Sell” recommendations are excluded from the sample. First regression tests whether the
decision to issue follower “Sell” depends on the previous period accuracy. Second regression uses
past average accuracy as explaining variable.
P (Follower Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β ×Accuracyij(t−1)
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
P (Follower Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β ×Average Accuracyijt
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
Relative Forecast Accuracy is an absolute forecast error of the last forecast of the analyst i for the
firm j before earnings announcement after the quarter t, scaled using the following formula.
Accuracyijt =
maxk(AFEkjt)−AFEijt
maxk(AFEkjt)−mink(AFEkjt)
Analyst characteristics, all scaled to range from 0 to 1 within each firm-quarter, are
Analysts experience - the number of years the analyst is present in I/B/E/S files;
Analyst′s firm specific experience - the number of years the analyst issues forecasts on the
firm prior the quarter of interest; Broker size - the number of analysts working for the broker;
Analyst′s workload - the number of the firms the analyst is following during this quarter.
Z-statistics are in parentheses.
By the stars, I denote a significance level of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
Accuracy -0.015 -0.001
(-0.75)
Average accuracy -0.009 -0.001
(-0.31)
Broker size -0.014 -0.001 -0.012 -0.001
(-0.82 ) (-0.71)
Analyst’s workload -0.011 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
( -0.58) (-0.47)
Analyst’s firm experience -0.008 -0.001 -0.010 -0.001
(-0.43) (-0.49)
Analyst’s general experience -0.178*** -0.014 -0.179*** -0.014
(-8.65) (-8.77)
Constant -1.680*** -1.687***
(-90.53) (-74.68)
N 101303 103006
Pseudo R2 0.0038 0.0038
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 1.5: Change in Relative Forecast Accuracy after the “Sell” issue
This table reports the influence of issuing first sell / follower-sell recommendation on the change in
relative forecast accuracy, controlling for change in forecasts’ age and frequency.
∆Accuracyijt = const+ β1 × First Sellijt + β2 × Follower Sell+
+β3 ×∆Ageijt + β4 ×∆Frequencyijt + εijt
∆Accuracy stays for difference between the Accuracy in the quarters preceding and following the
quarter when the“Sell” was issued.
If the sell recommendation was issued at time period t, then
∆Ageijt = Ageij(t+1) −Ageij(t−1);
∆Frequencyijt = Frequencyij(t+1) − Frequencyij(t−1)
Frequency is the number of the forecasts issued by an analyst for the firm during the quarter of
concern; Age (age of the forecast) is the number of days between the forecast issue and the earnings-
announcement date. First Sell (Follower Sell) is a dummy variables equal 1 if the analyst has
issued a first sell recommendation (sell recommendation) and 0 otherwise.
By the stars, I denote a significance level of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
∆ Accuracy
N = 75 623
Variables Coeff. t-Stat. p-Value [95% Conf. Interval]
Intercept 0.004* 2.74 0.006 0.001 0.009
First Sell -0.007 -0.74 0.462 -0.024 0.011
Follower Sell -0.021* -2.24 0.025 -0.039 -0.003
∆ Age -0.136*** -36.58 0.000 -0.143 -0.0128
∆ Frequency 0.024*** 6.68 0.000 0.016 0.031
R¯2 0.027
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 1.6: Control Variables for Current and Future Accuracy
The table displays variables influencing on relative forecast accuracy.
Control variable Definition / Computa-
tion
Expected sign of
the corresponding
regression coeffi-
cient
Comment
Analyst’s experi-
ence
The number of years
the analyst is present
in I/B/E/S files before
the period of interest
positive Clement (1999) finds
that accuracy is posi-
tively associated with
analyst experience.
However Jacob et
al (1999) find that
positive association
between experience
and accuracy de-
creases if controlled
for firm-specific
experience.
Analyst’s firm-
specific experi-
ence
The number of years
the analyst issues fore-
casts on the firm prior
the quarter of interest
positive First, due to “learning
by doing” an analyst
may improve his fore-
casting ability. Sec-
ond, the better an an-
alyst understands the
company he follows,
the more likely he will
not be replaced.
Broker size The number of ana-
lysts working for the
broker in the period of
interest
positive The broker size is con-
sidered as a proxy for
resources available to
the analysts.
Analyst’s work-
load
The number of firms
the analyst follows
during this quarter
negative The workload of an
analyst is the proxy
for analyst’s care and
attention.
Forecasts’ fre-
quency
The number of fore-
casts issued by an ana-
lyst for the firm during
the quarter of concern
positive The higher frequency
is associated with the
timely updates of the
forecasts.
Age of forecast The number of days
between the forecast
issue and the earnings-
announcement date
negative The later an analyst is-
sues a forecast, more
he can profit from
increased amount of
information.
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Table 1.7: Forecasts Accuracy and the First-“Sell” Issue
Model 1 examines if the relative accuracy in the period of first “Sell” issue is affected by this step:
Accuracyijt = const+ β × First Sellijt +
∑N
n=1 γn × Control V ariablesijt + εijt
Model 2 describes a dependence between a first “Sell” issue and a next period accuracy:
Accuracyij(t+1) = const+ β × First Sellijt +
∑N
n=1 γn × Control V ariablesij(t+1) + εijt
Relative Forecast Accuracy is an absolute forecast error of the last forecast of the analyst i for the
firm j before earnings announcement after the quarter t, scaled using the following formula.
Accuracyijt =
maxk(AFEkjt)−AFEijt
maxk(AFEkjt)−maxkmin(AFEkjt)
First Sell is a dummy variables equal 1 for a first sell recommendation, 0 for all other recommen-
dations.
Analyst and forecast characteristics, all scaled to range from 0 to 1 within each firm-quarter,
are Analysts experience - the number of years the analyst is present in I/B/E/S files;
Analyst′s firm specific experience - the number of years the analyst issues forecasts on the
firm prior the quarter of interest; Broker size - the number of analysts working for the bro-
ker; Analyst′s workload - the number of the firms the analyst is following during this quarter;
Forecasts′ frequency - the number of the forecasts issued by an analyst for the firm during the
quarter of concern; Age of forecast - the number of days between the forecast issue and the
earnings-announcement date.
T -statistics are in parentheses.
By the stars, I denote a significance level of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
Model 1 Model 2
Accuracyijt Accuracyij(t+1)
First Sell -0.026*** -0.024***
(-5.51) (-4.43)
Broker size 0.013*** 0.010**
(4.83) (3.24)
Analyst’s workload -0.012*** -0.015***
(-3.84) (-4.49)
Analyst’s firm experience 0.013*** -0.002
(4.50) (-0.48)
Analyst’s general experience -0.007* -0.004
(-2.10) (-1.14)
Age of forecast -0.132*** -0.139***
(-48.45) (-47.65)
Forecast’s frequency 0.034*** 0.021***
(13.36) (7.21)
Constant 0.648*** 0.669***
(242.42) (216.72)
N 148889 126450
R¯2 0.027 0.029
RMS error 0.362 0.360
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 1.8: Past PMAFE and the First-“Sell” Issue
This table presents the results of probit regressions. The dependent variable is First Sell, a dummy
variables equal 1 for a first sell recommendation, 0 for all other recommendations. First regression
tests whether the decision to issue first “Sell” depends on the previous period accuracy. Second
regression uses past average accuracy as explaining variable.
P (First Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β × PMAFEij(t−1)
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
P (First Sellijt = 1) = Φ(const+ β ×Average PMAFEijt
+
N∑
n=1
γn ×Analyst Characteristicsijt)
PMAFEijt is an absolute forecast error of the last forecast of the analyst i for the firm j before
earnings announcement after the quarter t, scaled using the following formula.
Accuracyijt =
DAFEijt
AFEjt
where DAFEijt = AFEijt −AFEjt
Analyst characteristics, all scaled to range from 0 to 1 within each firm-quarter, are
Analysts experience - the number of years the analyst is present in I/B/E/S files;
Analyst′s firm specific experience - the number of years the analyst issues forecasts on the
firm prior the quarter of interest; Broker size - the number of analysts working for the broker;
Analyst′s workload - the number of the firms the analyst is following during this quarter.
Z-statistics are in parentheses.
By the stars, I denote a significance level of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
Coefficients Marginal
Effects
PMAFE -0.019* -0.002
(- 2.46)
Average PMAFE -0.043** -0.005
(–3.22)
Broker size -0.009 -0.001 -0.009 -0.001
( -0.60) (-0.60)
Analyst’s workload 0.074*** 0.007 0.075*** 0.008
(4.58) (4.69 )
Analyst’s firm experience -0.012 -0.001 -0.011 -0.001
(-0.71) (-0.68)
Analyst’s general experience 0.116*** 0.012 0.113*** 0.011
(6.36) (6.23)
Constant -1.721*** -1.720***
(-123.84) (-124.27)
N 97251 97980
Pseudo R2 0.0025 0.0026
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 22
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What Do Managers Say Between The
Lines?
(in collaboration with Prof. Richard Zeckhauser)
Because managers are thought to possess important insider information, the numerous
investors pay attention not only to the factual information managers announce, but also to a
way how they tell it. The short-term market returns after the earnings announcement have
been shown to depend heavily on managers choice of words (after controlling for qualitative
information involved). Our aim is to investigate whether this market behavior is rational
and analysis of managers choice of words can provide rewarding information about future
companys fundamentals. We start by studying how past results influence the managers choice
of words. We find that the unexpected part of earnings earnings surprise influences the use
of both positive and negative words, while stock returns and changes in earnings affect the
use of negative words only. We examine differences in the prepared and the improvised parts
of managers speech, as they might signal uncertainty, fraud, or insincerity. We observe the
increase in these differences during the period preceding a bankruptcy and, more generally, in
association with the necessity to present poor results. We show that the degree of negativity
of the managers words, which is unexplained by past performance, helps to predict the future
earnings of the company. We also document that, as early as four quarters before a companys
bankruptcy, the verbal negativity of its managers becomes significantly higher than in viable
companies, even after controlling for the companies performances. The quantified word
choice of a manager contains incremental information for bankruptcy prediction, when used
in the classificatory model concurrently with accounting ratios.
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2.1 Introduction
The managers of companies commit to host quarterly-earnings-announcement conference
calls independently of their company’s performance and of their desire to talk to the pub-
lic. A typical conference call includes a discussion of the past, a preview of the future, and
answers to the analysts’ questions. The goal of the managers, it is normally asserted, is to
present their company’s results in the way that is most beneficial to the company’s value. It
would be natural to expect that managers would try to persuade analysts and investors that
their company had a bright future. However, they do not want to set unrealistic expecta-
tions; the market severely penalizes companies that fall short. Equally important, managers
cannot significantly misrepresent the truth in a way that would risk expensive litigation
and reputational damage. Their concern about the legitimacy of baseless statements causes
managers to be more negative in their statements than they would like, or to add a shade
of uncertainty to their positive statements.
A Boston-based consulting firm, Business Intelligence Advisors (BIA), employs former
CIA officers to verify the sincerity of top managers during their public presentations. Its
analysis of verbal and nonverbal clues during conference calls appears to have value, as
several important hedge funds employ BIA services.1 BIA deception detection services use
the CIA intelligence techniques of analyzing gestures, words, context, voice, changes in
presentation style, and many other details. Complaints, detour phrases, selective memory,
and overly courteous responses may serve as warning signs for BIA, whose work is not limited
to textual analysis. Without trying to compete with BIA in unveiling corporate paltering2,
we expand upon its ideas on searching for textual clues in order to extract more relevant
news from public disclosures.
We believe that managers’ choice of words is determined by all the information they have.
This includes information about the past, most of which either already has been disclosed or
soon will be, as well as insider information or, more accurately, the managers’ expectations
for the future, which they are not obliged to disclose. Therefore, the choice of words during a
conference call cannot be fully explained by the quantitative information describing the past
quarter’s performance: expected and unexpected earnings, unadjusted and abnormal stock
return, etc. Word choice is influenced also by the mood of the managers, their expectations
for the future, and internal information they do or do not intend to reveal.
This paper has two goals: first, to study how a company’s past performance influences
1http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/32290.html
2The American Heritage Dictionary defines paltering as acting misleadingly or insincerely. Other dic-
tionaries talk about deliberate ambiguity and withholding information. For a more detailed description of
different paltering practices and discussion on existing and potential ways to control them see Schauer and
Zeckhauser (2009).
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the manager’s speech, and second, to see whether the manager’s words that are not explained
by the past might help to predict the future. In looking at a company’s future, we choose
to concentrate on its future earnings rather than its stock price performance. While stock
prices and returns are subject to public perceptions and depend on the managers’ speech3,
real earnings are, in most cases4, independent of such influences.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that negative elements in managers’ speech,
which are not justified by previous performance, are associated with significantly lower future
earnings. This finding would be of only moderate interest if analysts correctly incorporated
such information. However, we document that financial analysts fail to capture this “soft”
information in their forecasts. They therefore, make forecasts that exceed actual earnings
for companies whose managers reveal such elements.
We wished to go beyond the improved prediction of earnings. Can the words of managers
provide refine estimates of salient events in a firm’s future? To address this question, in our
final empirical study we use the natural experiment of the recent financial turmoil with
its substantial toll of bankruptcies to study how the prospect of an imminent bankruptcy
influences the manager’s word choice. The goal is to learn whether there is a way to improve
our ability to foresee an elevated risk of bankruptcy by noting how managers speak. We find
that the threat of bankruptcy significantly impacts the managerial tone (level of optimism
or pessimism). Three to four quarters before a company’s bankruptcy, a manager’s tone
becomes significantly more negative than one would expect based on his company’s historical
performance. We test whether we can improve classical bankruptcy prediction models by
adding textual analysis data. We find that adding variables quantifying manager’s tone and
the degree of uncertainty of his speech improve classificatory ability of the model based on
financial ratios only.
Our study differs from, and is complementary to, existing textual-analysis studies of
management-expressed news. First, we use a different source of information conference call
transcripts. Previous textual-analysis studies focused on management-produced 10-K filings,
corporate annual reports, and press releases accompanying earnings-announcements, and on
media news content about companies. Conference call transcripts are similar in content to
earnings press releases, but are less formalized. They also include an improvised section when
3Kahneman and Tversky (1981) have shown that framing can affect the outcome (i.e., the choices one
makes) of choice problems. Investment decisions, therefore, depend on how the quantitative news are framed
by the managers.
4There are still some extreme cases in the durable goods industries or financial services, where the
perception of company stability has a direct impact on sales. Jensen and Meckling (1976) provide an
example of a computer industry: “There, the buyer’s welfare is dependent to a significant extent on the
ability to maintain the equipment, and on continuous hardware and software development. Furthermore,
the owner of a large computer often receives benefits from the software developments of other users. Thus,
if the manufacturer leaves the business or loses his software support and development experts because of
financial difficulties, the value of the equipment to his users will decline”.
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managers respond to questions. Thus, we are able to examine a new question: How does
the content of improvised speech differ from the content of a carefully prepared document
or formal speech? To draw an analogy, we are learning what a witness in a trial might say
under cross examination, as opposed to in response to the prepared questions of his lawyer.
Second, we consider the use of both positive and negative words. The only concurrent
study which uses positive and negative word counts combines them into a single variable by
subtracting negative words from positive words. ( Demers and Vega (2008).) To measure
the negative flavor of comments, we use the ratio of negative to positive words, instead of
simple word counts or frequencies of appearance.5
Third, we avoid using generic dictionaries such as Diction or General Inquirer, which
misrepresent the tone of financial news (Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming)). Instead
we construct our own checklists, assigning the non-neutral words most frequently used in
conference calls to positive or negative categories based on their use in the conference calls.
For a robustness check, we use the adjusted “Fin-Neg” lists offered by Bill McDonald on his
personal web-page.6 This lists are based on Harvard dictionary classification, but adjusted
to financial terminology.
Our study relates most closely to the recent work by Demers and Vega (2008), which
uses quarterly-earnings press releases as its prime information source, and argues in terms
of net optimism as indicated by positive, minus negative words. Though our methods are
similar, we aim to explore different problems. Instead of forecasting future returns (market
reaction to the managers’ words) as do Demers and Vega (2008), we seek to predict the
company’s real performance. We investigate whether, by their choice of words, managers
disclose internal information and shed light on the earnings prospects of their company and
the extreme event of bankruptcy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the literature
regarding the application of textual analysis to corporate reporting. In Section 3, we describe
our data and give a brief overview of the methods we employ. In Section 4, we examine how
quarterly performance influences a manager’s negativity and his use of obfuscating speech.
In Section 5, we investigate whether the managers’ word choice provides insight into future
earnings, and whether financial analysts successfully integrate this information into their
forecasts. In Section 6, we see how a manager’s word choice can help us to recognize prospects
for imminent bankruptcy. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
5Word count is the number of appearance of a category of words in a speech. Frequency of appearance
is the ratio of a category’s word count to the total number of words in a speech.
6www.nd.edu/∼mcdonald/Word Lists.html
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2.2 Previous literature: textual analysis of companies’
provided information
There are several text sources of company-provided information used for textual analysis:
comments by company spokesman quoted by the media ( Ober, Zhao, Davis, and Alexan-
der (1999)); 10K annual reports (Li (2006), Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming)); and
quarterly earnings announcements ( Demers and Vega (2008) and Davis, Piger, and Sedor
(2008)).
The two most researched characteristics of a financial text are 1) degrees of positivism
(optimism) or negativism (pessimism) and 2) certainty versus uncertainty. The common
method applied is to use either counts or frequencies of specific groups of words in the
text. Most authors prefer word counts when dealing with certainty/uncertainty (Li (2006);
Ober, Zhao, Davis, and Alexander (1999)), and frequencies when measuring “optimism” or
“pessimism” ratios of total number of positive or negative words to the number of words
in the speech (Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2008); Tetlock (2007)). Demers and Vega (2008)
use frequencies measuring optimism and pessimism, certainty and uncertainty, their prime
variables are net optimism and net certainty - differences in corresponding frequencies.
The major issue that has been explored by finance researchers in this area is the market’s
reaction to the “soft information” in a company’s news. Demers and Vega (2008) and Davis,
Piger, and Sedor (2008) observe a significant market response to managers’ net optimism
after the earnings announcements. Demers and Vega (2008) find that the unexpected com-
ponent of managers’ net optimism is significantly associated with short-window returns, and
that it also predicts post-earnings-announcement drift. Both studies use Diction7 software
to classify words.
Demers and Vega (2008) also find that the level of certainty expressed in managers’
language is inversely associated with a firm’s abnormal return volatility. Use of more uncer-
tain words and wavering language in managerial earnings announcements is associated with
abnormal, idiosyncratic stock volatility.
The papers of Ober, Zhao, Davis, and Alexander (1999) and Li (2006) are devoted
entirely to certainty measures. Ober, Zhao, Davis, and Alexander (1999) find that the
corporate expression of certainty in public business discourse is not affected by organizational
profitability status or by industry type. They find that a significant difference in the use of
certainty words exists between oral and written corporate communications.
Li (2006) reduces the list of uncertain words to the words “risk” and “uncertainty” (in
7http://www.dictionsoftware.com/ The software applies an algorithm, which uses a series of thirty-
three dictionaries (word-lists) to search text passages for different semantic features such as, e.g., praise,
satisfaction, or denial.
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different forms) and measures managers’ risk sentiment by the frequency of these words in
the annual corporate reports. Li finds that an increase in the use of these words is associated
with lower earnings in the following year. A portfolio, constructed by buying stocks of the
firms with a minor increase of risk sentiment in annual reports and by shorting shares of the
firms with a large increase in risk sentiment, generates significant positive annual abnormal
returns.
The only above-mentioned research that does not apply generic word classifications
is Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming). That work not only avoids using Diction or
General Inquirer 8, software but shows how the Harvard Dictionary, the basis for generic
textual-analysis software, misclassifies words in financial contexts (for example, “liability”
or “taxes”). They find that almost three-fourths of the negative-word counts according to
the Harvard list are attributable to words that are often not negative in a financial context.
That paper offers two solutions: a) adjusted lists, which classify words according to their
usual meanings in a financial context; and b) term weighting. Loughran and McDonald
(forthcoming) apply both methods to the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)
part of annual 10-K filings. They find significant relationships between the words used and
filing-date returns, trading volume, and subsequent return volatility. They find no evidence
of return predictability. They also link the word lists successfully to earnings surprise in the
first quarter, to fraud, and to material weakness.
Textual analysis methods are widely applied to the information coming not only from
insiders, but also from other agents on the market, such as analysts or media. Several works
relate market returns to the qualitative content of such news. Tetlock (2007) measures the
tone of the Wall Street Journal market coverage section and finds that media variables affect
both returns and trading volumes. Engelberg (2009) finds that the frequency of negative
words in the media news has predictability for asset prices. Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and
Macskassy (2008) extend the approach, adding companies’ fundamentals to the analysis.
They find that a higher frequency of negative words in firm-specific news stories is associ-
ated with lower firm future earnings, and that the stock market briefly underreacts to the
information embedded in the negative words.
The attempts to extract qualitative information from companies’ reports go beyond tex-
tual analysis. Mayew and Venkatachalam (2009) measure managers’ affects during confer-
ence calls, applying vocal-emotion-analysis software to audio recordings. They find that
managers’ displays of positive and negative affect are respectively positively and negatively
related to contemporaneous stock returns and to future unexpected earnings.
8more information about General Inquirer software can be found at
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/∼inquirer/. The main differences between GI and Diction are word-
lists and the handling of homographic terms. Demers and Vega (2008) find that GI’s negativity (positivity)
sentiment and Diction’s pessimism (optimism) sentiment are correlated measures (ρ=0.40).
28
CHAPTER 2
2.3 Data and methods
Our analysis is based on the S&P 500 companies appearing in the index as of 01.03.2007,
and the largest bankrupt companies appearing in the Chapter 11 Library c© in 2007-2009.
Thomson Reuters has transcripts for 451 companies of the S&P 500 list; it is the source
of the conference call transcripts that we use. Our sample includes earnings announcements
for the period from 2004 to 2009. Earnings and forecasts data is from I/B/E/S. Price and
returns data is from CRSP.
Wishing neither to misclassify words nor to get the result out of the black box, we avoid
using generic software. We elaborate the list of positive, negative, and uncertain words, based
on the most frequently used words in conference calls. First, we compute the appearances
of all words in all managers’ speeches during all conference calls in our sample. Then, from
among the most frequently used words, we choose the words belonging to three following
groups: 1) positive words, 2) negative words, and 3) words of uncertainty. We present
the complete list of chosen words in Table 2.1. Words in the groups are ordered by their
frequency of usage.
[Table 2.1 insert here]
To test the robustness of our analysis of the choice of words, we use the alternative word
lists compiled by Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming) . These lists comprise the Harvard
IV GI lists, adjusted for financial terminology. This classification contains 2,337 negative,
353 positive, and 285 uncertain words. Here are some examples of words in the Loughran and
McDonald classification (referred to also in this paper as the “extensive classification”): neg-
ative - abandon, bridge, caution; positive - able, beautiful, charitable; uncertain - abeyance,
clarification, depend.
Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) express a concern that positive word
counts do not properly reflect the attitude of the speaker because such words are frequently
negated. We correct the number of positive words to account for negation. We exclude a
positive word from the count when one of three negation words (no, not, none) occurs among
the three words preceding the positive word.
We measure a speech’s negativity as the ratio of negative words to positive words. We
distinguish the negativity of each prepared presentation from that of its Q&A session, as
these two parts are fundamentally different. A presentation is prepared and proofread in
advance, whereas answers must to some extent represent improvisations.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics on the frequencies of different kinds of words used
in a manager’s speech, as well as on variables describing company’s performance.
[Table 2.2 insert here]
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The earnings surprise for an announcement is the difference between the actual earnings
for the quarter recorded in I/B/E/S and the mean analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S
detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement, divided by the
stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics of different kinds’ of words frequencies in managers’
speeches as well as on companies’ performance.
[Table 2.3 insert here]
The earnings surprise for an announcement is the difference between the actual earnings
for the quarter recorded in I/B/E/S and the mean analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S
detail file during the 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement, divided by the
stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.
Let et,j be the earnings announced for the company j at quarter t and eˆt,j be the corre-
sponding consensus forecast. Denote by Pt,j the price of shares of company j 5 trading days
before the announcement in quarter t. The earnings surprise st, j is
st,j =
et,j − eˆt,j
Pt,j
(2.1)
The quarter capital gain is the difference in stock price 5 trading days before earnings an-
nouncement, minus the stock price 5 trading days after the previous earnings announcement,
divided by the later.
Let Pj,t−1,+5 be the stock price for the company j 5 days after an earnings announcement
for quarter t−1 and let Pj,t,−5 be the stock price for the company j 5 days before an earnings
announcement for quarter t. Then the quarter-end capital gain price is
Capital gainjt =
Pj,t,−5 − Pj,t−1,+5
Pj,t−1,+5
(2.2)
The quarter change in earnings is the earnings at quarter t, minus the earnings in quarter
t− 1, scaled by the stock price 5 days before the earnings announcement.
∆Earningsjt =
Earningsjt − Earningsjt−1
Pricet,−5
(2.3)
We provide more details on other variables’ computations in the corresponding chapters.
2.4 What do managers talk and not talk about?
This section has two goals. First, it determines the most important performance mea-
sures for a company’s management. This is important in order to understand the logic of
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managers’ actions and to evaluate to what extent their interests are aligned with the interests
of shareholders. It is also an important step to undertake before using textual analysis as
a forecasting tool. Before looking at the future through the managers’ choice of words, we
need to understand how the past performance drives that choice.
Second, it examines how the character of reporting is modified in relation to the changes
a company’s performance. Here we are interested not so much in what is said, but in what is
meant to be said. Do the managers omit something, deliberately obfuscating the truth? The
BIA service would check this by measuring the time gap before answering a question and
the trembling of the voice; it might also use video images when available. We suggest below
several measures, which may help to identify paltering, when using only a written transcript.
2.4.1 Interpreting quarter results.
Managers host a quarterly conference call to announce and comment on earnings in
the prior quarter. It would be natural to assume that, as the earnings discussion is the
purpose of the call, the quality of earnings should be the most important factor determining
the managers’ mood and consequently the word choice. It is possible, however, that the
managers, and perhaps the investors, care more about some other results. The best way
to determine which performance characteristics are most important to the managers is to
investigate how the changes in those characteristics influence the managers’ tone.
To measure that tone, we employ the variable Negativity, equal to the ratio of the
number of negative words to the number of positive words.
Negativity =
Negative words
Positive words
(2.4)
We use the following OLS model to test which factors most influence the Negativity
measure.
Negativityt = Const+ β1Capital gaint,t−1 + β2∆Earningst,t−1 + β3Surprise decilet+
+β4Market returnt,t−1 + 
(2.5)
where Capital gaint,t−1 the percentage stock return for the period between two earnings
announcements, is computed according to (2.2).
∆Earningst,t−1 the change in earnings between two earnings announcements, normalized
by the stock prices is computed by (2.3).
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Surpriset is the earnings surprise the difference between the actual earnings in quarter t
and the average analysts’ forecast issued 30 days prior to the earnings announcement, scaled
by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement is computed by (2.1).
When a firm underperforms expectations and the surprise is negative, the Surprise decile
will take values from -5 (for the largest negative surprises) to -1 (for the smallest surprises).
Positive surprises are similarly divided into quintiles, taking the values from 1 to 5 from
smallest to largest.
Market returnt,t−1 is the equally weighted market return for the period starting 5 days
after an earnings announcement for the quarter t−1 and ending 5 days prior to the earnings
announcement for the quarter t.
The fixed-effects model controls for the peculiarities in announcement style of different
companies. In fact, managers have their particular vocabularies, and some of them have a
penchant for using more positive/negative/uncertain words than others.
The results of estimations are in table 2.4.
[Table 2.4 insert here]
Table 2.5 displays estimates using the same models, with the only difference being that
we compute the negativity ratio using the extensive classification lists suggested by Loughran
and McDonald (forthcoming) - the FinList. We make this analysis to check the robustness
of our results and also to investigate whether the results are driven by the most frequently
used words or by those used rarely. This analysis checks whether our results are robust and
also investigates if they are driven by the most frequently used words or by the words rarely
used.
[Table 2.5 insert here]
The tables show that the results do not depend on the choice of word classification list.
When the extensive classification is used, regression coefficients change insignificantly.
The tone of the presentations prepared in advance is stronger impacted by the perfor-
mance characteristics than the tone of the improvised answers to the analysts’ questions. The
change in earnings compared to the previous quarter plays an important role in determining
the managers’ tone. Capital gain impacts the tone of the presentations, even after control-
ling for the general market performance. However, in the model explaining manager’s tone
in improvised answers, the coefficient at Capital gain variable is not statistically significant
on any conventional level.
Besides the change in earnings, managers care significantly about the difference between
actual earnings and market expectations. These findings confirm the importance to managers
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of beating the market expectations, as described by Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999).
The findings are robust whether we use as a regressor in the model the surprise’s deciles or
the surprise itself. The coefficient of determination is, however, higher for the models with
deciles.
Market returns during the past quarter are negatively correlated with the negativity of
managers’ speech. This means that when the markets are down, managers reflect it in their
speech and do not try to sweeten the news with overwhelming enthusiasm and positiveness
to encourage the public.
The negativity of the managers’ answers to the analysts’ questions is significantly corre-
lated with the negativity of the analysts’ questions, more negative questions receiving more
negative answers.
To disentangle the effect on negativity caused by negative words and positive words, we
make the same kind of analysis for frequencies of each category. The results are in Table 2.6
for the shorter classification and in Table 2.7 for the FinList.
[Table 2.6 insert here]
[Table 2.7 insert here]
We find that the managers’ use of negative words can be explained much more easily
than their use of positive words. Adjusted R2 is noticeably lower for the positive words’
frequencies.
Two characteristics are significantly associated with the use of positive words: earnings
surprise and market returns. The frequency of negative words in the presentations is neg-
atively and significantly correlated with two more factors: capital gain during the quarter
and change in earnings. However, we were unable to reject the hypothesis that the use of
negative words in questions and answers is independent of the change in earnings. Negative
words become more frequent when the economy worsens, when the shareholders experience
capital loss, or when the firm’s earnings fall below the analysts’ forecasts. Earnings surprise
appears to be one of the most crucial results discussed by the managers and questioned by
the analysts.
2.4.2 Paltering.
Conference calls are an important means of dissemination of a company’s news. The
goal of managers, it is normally asserted, is to present a company’s results in the way that is
most beneficial to the company’s value. It would be natural to expect that managers, even
when they have poor results to present, would try to persuade investors that their money
is not too greatly at risk. However, at the same time, the managers’ efforts to keep value
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up are subject to the constraint that they not significantly misrepresent the truth in a way
that would risk expensive litigation and reputational damage. The other constraint is the
necessity to keep market expectations regarding future earnings at a reasonable level, in a
way that these expectations can be met.
In this subsection, we investigate what managers do not talk about. We ask which
parameters of a past company’s performance may incline a manager to omit, obfuscate, or
avoid certain subjects.
We identify several patterns of evasive behavior and analyze their correlations to the
firm’s performance. The indicative patterns studied are:
1. Use of specific “uncertain” words or constructions ( see the classification in Table 2.1).
2. Significant differences in negativity between presentations (prepared speech) and an-
swers (improvised speech).
When preparing a presentation, managers, aware of the great importance of every word,
carefully ponder the possible impact of each locution. When improvising answers,
managers, without the luxury of time for crafting responses, instinctively avoid saying
anything negative. When taken by surprise by a provocative question, managers might
be inclined to sweeten the truth. Corporate lawyers are unable to intervene to prevent
managers’ improvised sugarcoating and to ensure that they do not cross the acceptable
line of puffery. In fact, in 2/3 of our observations, more negativity is expressed in the
presentations than in the answers. The average negativity in the presentations is
significantly greater than in answers.
3. Using a “wrong” tense.
Presentations should announce and explain past results. Answers should clarify missed
points, explain the current situation, or give a preview of the future. If too few sen-
tences in the presentation are in the past tense, the managers are possibly misleading
the listeners by diverting their attention from actual outcomes to events that have
not yet happened. If too many answers use the past tense, it means either that the
managers have prepared an insufficient or unclear announcement, or that the managers
are avoiding talking about the present and the future. Summarizing, we would suspect
paltering activity when the use of the past tense declines in the managers’ presentation
and increases in their answers.
We investigate how the choice of verb tenses shifts with the changes in the company’s
or the market’s performance. We are also interested in whether the choices of tense
and the negativity in the managers’ tones are related. When managers have bad news
to communicate, do they spend more time than usually explaining present corrective
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measures and projecting future successful undertakings? For automated recognition
of verb tenses we extensively used Natural Language Toolkit library9 in the following
way:
• for each sentence, all words in it were tagged with Part-of-Speech tags (POS
tagging10) ;
• then each tagged sentence was chunked into Name and Verb phrases
• for each verb phrase, its tense is deduced from the POS tag of the first word with
a number of heuristics to correct the most common errors of POS tagging;
• if a sentence contains several verb phrases, its tense is defined as a most common
tense among its phrases. If a most common tense is not defined, the sentence
tense is not defined.
After we have assigned the tenses to each sentence we classify them as describing past
present or future with the announcement day as a reference point11
We find that, in the prepared presentations, higher earnings surprise is associated with
greater use of the past tense. In managers’ improvised answers, earnings surprises are
positively correlated with the use of the future tense. However, the difference in the
size of these effects is negligible.
The correlation of the negativity in the managers’ tone with their choice of tense is
much more significant. A higher negativity level coincides with more extensive talk
about the past.
Table 2.8 presents the results of the the tense-usage analysis.
[Table 2.8 insert here]
The constant shows that, normally, more than half of the phrases in presentations
use the past tense and more than half of the phrases in questions and answers use
the present tense. We see that the choice of tense is correlated with the managers’
negativity. The more negative the managers are, the more their talk is about the past.
The effect is stronger pronounced for the prepared speech than for the improvised
9www.nltk.org
10POS tagging and sentence chunking are implemented using standard statistical methods
from NTLK library. For more details see http://streamhacker.com/2008/11/10/part-of-speech-
tagging-with-nltk-part-2/; http://streamhacker.com/2009/02/23/chunk-extraction-with-nltk/ and
http://streamhacker.com/2008/12/29/how-to-train-a-nltk-chunker/.
11The difficulties here arise with the classification of present perfect tense. We classify it for our use as the
past-oriented speech, according to the definition of Merriam-Webster dictionary: “present perfect is a verb
tense that expresses action or state completed at the time of speaking”
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answers. Apparently, they try not to talk about the present and future unless the
general tone can be positive.
4. Switching to a different time frame.
Another evasive tactic is to switch the tense when answering an analyst’s question.
Switching a tense can be a way to avoid a liability, or, in other cases, it can be an
effort to attract the public’s attention to a more glorious period (usually somewhere
in the future).
An example of time orientation switch is an answer given by Lehman Brothers’ CEO
Dick Fuld on the second-quarter 2008 conference call. A Bank of America analyst
asked, “Are you guys seeing any impact, some of the rumors circulating in the mar-
ketplace, driving a reduction in client activity or counter parties pulling away from
Lehman?” Dick Fuld switched to present perfect from present, referring to the time
preceding the announcement and answered: “We’ve seen nothing significant across
prime broker balances, derivatives, secured lending markets, short end unsecured mar-
kets, we’ve seen nothing significant.” Despite formally both question and answer are
in present tense, the answer was oriented to the time preceding the announcement.
Managers switch the time frames in both directions. Analysts get future projections
when asking about achieved results. In uncertain times, questions about the current
activities or the future opportunities of a company are answered with glorious stories
about past successes. The switches from the past are almost four times more frequent
in our sample than switches to the past. On average, in a conference call, 43% of
questions using the past tense receive an answer oriented to the present or future. The
proportion of future-tense questions receiving past-tense answers is 11%.
Are switches in time frame strategic? If so, they should relate to conditions of the
company. Table 2.9 examines this question.
[Table 2.9 insert here]
Past performance has a low impact on managers’ inclinations to switch tenses. When
the financial performance of a quarter is particularly good (for both the company and
the market in general), managers like to look back even when not asked to do so.
Higher earnings surprise, however, decreases the proportion of questions about the
present or future, which do not receive answers regarding the same time frame. The
more aggressive the questions are, the more inclined to switch to the past the managers
are.
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The only factor we find that impacts managers’ desire to avoid talk about the past is
the negativity of the questions. The more negative the questions are, the less managers
switch the time-frame replying to the past-oriented questions.
In Table 2.10, we present correlations of different evasive measures with each other, with
the manager’s tone, and with past performance.
[Table 2.10 insert here]
We also investigate how the use of these paltering techniques by managers impacts market
efficiency. Table 2.11 presents the coefficients of regressions explaining the following variables:
the forecast revision frequency, the variance of analysts’ forecasts, and the speed of analysts’
reactions to the announcement. We control for market return during the quarter as a proxy
for the stability of the economy.
[Table 2.11 insert here]
Negativity is positively associated with revision frequency and variance of forecasts. It is
negatively correlated with the speed of analysts’ reactions. This means that higher degrees
of negativity coincides with higher degrees of uncertainty for analysts. Higher concentration
on discussions of the past in the managers’ presentations leads to faster and better-grounded
reactions, with fewer revisions by analysts. Inversely, concentration on the past in the an-
swers obscures the situation and makes analysts ponder longer before issuing a new forecast.
An unexpected result is that a greater frequency of uncertain words reduces revision fre-
quency. We should keep in mind, however, that the frequency of revisions is low not only
when analysts get exhaustive information and do not need to adjust it later, but also when
the information is so uninformative that there is no point in changing the forecast.
2.5 Predictive power of textual analysis
The goal of this section is to find out whether the textual analysis has any value for
forecasting future performance of a company. The association of “soft” (not factual) in-
formation expressed by managers and future performance of the companies was a core of
several studies, concentrated mostly on stock returns12. As stock returns are in large a re-
sult of market reaction to “soft” information itself, we focus on operational performance and
financial stability of the companies.
12Engelberg (2009), Demers and Vega (2008), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008)
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2.5.1 Forecasting earnings.
Thousands of professional financial analysts constantly endeavor to provide timely and
accurate forecasts of the earnings of the companies they follow. On average, there are 13
analysts issuing a report on every S&P 500 company each quarter. With their research being
available to the public, does it make sense to work on independent predictions by examining
such details as excessive managers’ negativity? It would make sense under two conditions:
1) The degree of managers’ negativity contains certain internal information; and 2) Analysts
do not systematically capture this information in their forecasts.
The first statement hypothesizes that a manager at the moment of the earnings announce-
ment of quarter t already has some idea of what to expect in the quarter t + 1. He might
reveal his insight unintentionally, or possibly without noticing. Alternatively, he might reveal
it intentionally to avoid possible legal consequences or to bring down the market’s expec-
tations. This means that the component of the managers’ negativity unexplained by past
results provides information about that company’s prospects. This argument yields the first
testable hypothesis of the information leak.
• INFORMATION LEAK HIL0: The managers reveal information about future earnings
of the company by choosing (consciousnessly or subconsciousnessly) the presentation
tone.
To test this hypothesis we formulate an alternative statement:
• INFORMATION LEAK HILa : The managers’ negativity above/below the benchmark
in the earnings announcement is not correlated with the earnings in the next quarter.
In order to understand whether the analysts’ forecasts can be improved if adjusted ac-
cording to the degree of the managers’ negativity we test the following set of hypotheses.
• WISE ANALYSTS HWA0 : Analysts’ forecasts capture the tone of managers’ speech,
and their forecast errors do not depend on the degree of the managers’ negativity above
or below the benchmark.
• WISE ANALYSTS HWAa : Managers’ tone is informative about earnings, after taking
into account analysts’ estimates.
To test whether we can reject the two alternative hypotheses above, we first estimate the
benchmark, the normal level of negativity justified by the company’s past performance. We
use the model 2.5, including firm fixed effects, to explain the managers’ choice of words by
the company’s and the market’s past performances. Then, for every observation, starting
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from January 2006, we estimate the “normal” degree of negativity based on all preceding
data. We call the difference between actual negativity and the fitted value “Negativity
Residual” (NRP for presentations and NRA for answers). Negativity residuals measure the
excessive negativity - the negativity which cannot be justified by past performance. Under
our hypothesis, positive residuals would signal managers’ expectations of lower earnings in
the future, while negative residuals would mean that managers feel more secure about the
future than one could expect given the past results.
To investigate whether this new measure adds information to forecast earnings, we com-
pare two models. The first one equation (6) explains the earnings in quarter t+1 by the
earnings in the two preceding quarters, the size (decile) of earnings surprise at quarter t,
and the market returns during the quarter t.
To test whether these alternative hypotheses can be rejected the first step is to estimate
the benchmark, the normal level of negativity, justified by the company past performance.
We use the model 2.5, including firm fixed effects, to explain the managers’ choice of words
by past company’s and market’s performances. Then, for every observation starting from
January 200613 we estimate the “normal” degree of negativity based on all preceding data.
We call the difference between actual negativity and fitted value - Negativity Residual
(NRP for presentations and NRA for answers). Negativity residuals measure the excessive
negativity - the negativity which can not be justified by the past results. Under our hy-
pothesis positive residuals would signal lower earnings in the future, while negative residuals
would mean that managers feel more secure about the future than one can expect given the
past results.
To investigate whether this new measure can add value to the forecasting of earnings we
compare two models. The first one - equation 2.6 - explains earnings in quarter t+ 1 by the
earnings in two preceding quarters, size (decile) of earnings surprise at quarter t and market
returns during the quarter t.
Earningst+1 = Const+ β1Earningst + β2Earningst−1 + β3Surprise decilet
+ β4Market returnt +  (2.6)
The second model - equation 2.7 - includes Negativity residualst both NRP (for pre-
sentations) and NRA (for answers to analysts). As the residuals of different sign may have
different correlations with future earnings, we separate positive and negative residuals, by
multiplying them on dummy variables.
13this choice is dictated by the necessity to have enough preceding observations to estimate the model
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Earningst+1 = Const+ β1Earningst + β2Earningst−1 + β3Surprise decilet+
+ β4Market returnt + β5NRPt × SignDummyP + β6NRPt × (1− SignDummyP )+
+ β7NRAt × SignDummyA + β8NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) +  (2.7)
where SignDummy is equal to 1 if negativity residuals (NRA or NRA accordingly to
the index) are positive and 0 otherwise.
We also test whether the knowledge of negativity residuals can make any input into the
model after we have taken into consideration the financial analysts’ forecasts. We compute
analysts’ consensus following the earnings announcement to the quarter t as average of all
forecasts valid on the third day after earnings announcement. We assume that three days
period is sufficient for analysts to incorporate new information. According to previous re-
search, analysts forecasts revisions cluster around earnings announcements (Bagnoli, Levine,
and Watts (2002), Zhang (2008)) with most revisions falling on the day of announcements
or next trading day.14
Table 2.12 presents the results of our estimations. To be able to compare adjusted R2
for different models, all of them are tested on the same group of observations.
[Table 2.12 insert here]
The results are robust to use of extended financial lists of words classification offered by
Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming).
[Table 2.13 insert here]
The results reject Ha1 hypothesis as we see that excessive negativity is positively cor-
related with future earnings. Despite analysts’ forecasts are one of the best estimators for
future earnings, we get higher adjusted R2 when we include negativity residuals into the
model. This is the first, but not yet sufficient, evidence that analysts do not fully incorpo-
rate information contained in managers’ negativity into their forecasts.
Despite cases with negative negativity residuals are almost twice more common, than
positive residuals, the coefficients at negative residuals are statistically insignificant at any
conventional level. Positive residuals have predictive power while negative residuals do not.
When manager is excessively negative both in presentation and answers, it signals lower
earnings in the future. The negativity below expected level can not help in forecasting
future earnings.
14Zhang (2008) asserts that depending on the year, about 26-53% of analysts revise their forecasts within
1 day after earnings announcement.
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The fact adjusted R2 is higher for the model which supplements analysts’ consensus
with negativity residuals, than for the one with consensus as the only explanatory variable,
does not prove superiority of model analysis over the use of analysts’ predictions. Investors
usually do not include analysts’ forecasts as a parameter in some linear model, they take
it at the face value. We find no significant differences between the mean values of scaled
forecast errors of analysts’ consensus and obtained using the fitted values for regressions with
negativity residuals.
As we are not yet able to forecast earnings with the help of textual analysis better than
analysts, the next reasonable try to use our knowledge would be to help adjust analysts’ fore-
cast. The next question we ask is whether managers’ negativity is correlated with analysts’
forecast error. Answering this question we are going to test Ha2
We define Forecast Error (FE) as the difference between consensus forecast and actual
earnings, scaled by the price to ensure comparability of errors for different quarters and
firms.
FEt =
(Consensus forecastt−1,t − Actualt)
Pricet−1
(2.8)
where Consensus forecastt−1,t is the average of all forecasts for quarter t outstanding 3
days after earnings announcement for quarter t− 1; Pricet−1 is the stock price at the day of
quarter t− 1 earnings announcement.
We estimate the following OLS model
AFEt+1 = Const+ β1Market returnt+1 + β2Revision Frequencyt+1+
+ β3NRPt × SignDummyP + β4NRPt × (1− SignDummyP )+
+ β5NRAt × SignDummyA + β6NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) +  (2.9)
where AFEt+1 = |FEt+1| is the Absolute Forecast Error. We use market returns and
revision frequency as proxies for the quarter-firm complicated for forecasting, when markets
are not stable and/or new information comes lately after earnings announcements.
To avoid that the results are driven by errors-outliers, we winsorize15 Absolute Forecast
Errors at top 1% of observations.
[Table 2.14 insert here]
Negativity above the level justified by the previous performance is positively correlated
with both forecast error and absolute forecast error. It means that positive and negative
15To winsorize means to transform extreme values: the extreme observations takes values of the boundary
observation.
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errors do not change in a similar way. Positive errors (expectations are above actual earn-
ings) become larger and possibly more frequent when managers are excessively negative.
This would happen when analysts overestimate the future earnings. Thus, analysts do not
incorporate sufficiently excessive negativity into their forecasts.
With higher revision frequency and worse performing market, the absolute errors go
up as well as forecast errors do. Positive negativity residuals (excessive negativity) remain
significant in the model with controls.
Interestingly, the negativity below normal level (computed with the short classification)
decreases absolute forecast error without a significant effect on forecast error. In other words,
it decreases general uncertainty. The absolute errors are smaller with lower residuals, but it
involves both positive and negative errors. Excessively positive managers either can provide
more exact information for analysts to ground their forecasts or have better tools to manage
the earnings to be closer to the estimate. The difference in the results obtained with short
and long word classifications is driven by extreme negative NRP of the extensive list. When
extreme observations are winsorized at 1%, the coefficients at negative residuals become
significant comparably with the model based on short-listed words.
For better understanding of what happens with forecast errors at different levels of neg-
ativity, we provide the table 2.15.
[Table 2.15 insert here]
Generally, analysts errors are biased toward negative - actual earnings exceed analysts’
forecasts. Previous literature has shown that managers benefit from reporting earnings
that are higher than the analysts’ forecasts (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn (2002), Kasznik and
McNichols (2002), Brown and Caylor (2005), Matsumoto (2002)) . As consequence they can
manage earnings (Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999)) or incentivize analysts to issue
lower forecasts (Ke and Yu (2006), Francis and Philbrick (1993b), Hong and Kubik (2003b)).
We see on our sample, that when managers are excessively negative about the future,
share of cases with positive forecast errors rises. Negative errors tend to be smaller than
positive errors in absolute value which is consistent with the concept of companies taking a
“big bath” when not able to meet or beat analysts’ expectations.
Negative forecast errors increases in absolute value with increase of negativity residuals.
This mean that when firms are beating forecasts despite excessive negativity, are beating
them by larger amount. This means that analysts may incorporate some of information con-
tained in the speech negativity into the analysis. However, mean of positive errors increases
at much larger rates and also the frequency of positive errors goes up with increase in ex-
cessive negativity. Analysts forecasts happen to be too upward biased despite the managers
having excessively negative attitude.
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As we reject both alternative hypotheses, we come to the conclusion, that negativity
above benchmark contains valuable information about next quarter earnings and can serve
to adjust analysts’ forecasts.
2.5.2 Forecasting bankruptcy.
The use of accounting information to predict bankruptcy or financial distress was pio-
neered by Beaver (1966), Beaver (1962) and Altman (1968). First to add qualitative infor-
mation to the bankruptcy prediction models, Tennyson, Ingram, and Dugan (1990) analyzed
two kinds of managers’ narrative disclosures: President’s Letter and Management’s Discus-
sion and Analysis of Results. They use the WORDS program developed by Harway and Iker
(1969) to assign factor loadings to several content groups. They find that for the Manage-
ment Analysis the quantity of words focused on the firm growth and expansion is negatively
correlated with the likelihood of bankruptcy. For the Presidents’ Letter the increase in use
of the words focused on specific internal problems is increasing the likelihood of bankruptcy.
The aim of our research is to continue the investigation on how textual analysis can help
in forecasting financial distress. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has led to a huge number
of bankruptcy filings. We use these cases as a natural experiment to study the “language” of
bankruptcy. We focus particularly on two parameters: negativity of the speech and degree
of evasive behavior.
We formulate two following hypotheses:
• BANKRUPTS’ CHANGING TONE HYPOTHESIS HB1: A systematic difference ex-
ists between the negativity of the speech of firms approaching bankruptcy and firms
that are not.
• BANCRUPTCY PREDICTABILITY HYPOTHESIS HB2: Words’ choice contains in-
formation useful for classifying firms ex-ante into bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups
when considered in addition to accounting ratios.
We use the list of bankrupts with assets of over 100 million dollars from the Chapter 11
Library. Despite the length of the list of bankrupts, only a few of the companies have their
conference call transcripts in the StreetEvents database. After we exclude companies for
which the data is unavailable in any of our 3 data sources (StreetEvents, CRSP, I/B/E/S),
we stay with 50 bankrupt companies. We randomly select 100 non-bankrupt companies from
the S&P 500 (2007) list, keeping the proportions of the various industries the same as for the
bankrupt companies. For the bankrupt companies, we define the Distance variable, measur-
ing the distance from an earnings announcement to the bankruptcy in quarters. Distance
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is equal to 1 for the last earnings announcement before filing for Chapter 11. We examine
up to 6 quarters prior to the bankruptcy.
Graphs on Figure 2.1 plot the changes of managers’ tone in the time.
[Figure 2.1 insert here]
These graphs, however, do not account for the very important factor of the general mood
in economy during a specific time period. This creates a bias: most bankruptcy cases happen
in times of trouble when the overall economy does poorly and the degree of negativity in
anyone’s speech is higher. To avoid this bias, we compute the abnormal negativity as the
difference between the managers’ negativity and the average negativity for all firms in the
sample in the same quarter.
Abnormal negativityit = Negativityit −
N∑
i=1
Negativityit × 1
N
(2.10)
where i is a firm, t is a quarter and N is a number of firms in the quarter. To compute
the average negativity, we use observations of both future-bankrupt and never-bankrupt
companies. In the same way we compute abnormal frequency of positive and negative words.
Graphs on Figure 2.2 plot the tone measures adjusted by the average.
[Figure 2.2 insert here]
This graphical interpretation are consistent with the BANKRUPTS’ CHANGING TONE
HYPOTHESIS HB1. We see that abnormal negativity, as well as the frequency of the nega-
tive words have tendency to rise with the bankruptcy approaching. This behavior is more pro-
nounced for the prepared speeches than for improvised answers to analysts’ questions. The
frequency of positive words in presentations picks three quarters before the bankruptcy, while
in answers it changes smoothly and drops in the last earnings-announcement-conference-call
before the bankruptcy. Apparently, three to four quarters before the bankruptcy the elo-
quence of the managers still can persuade the public that the company is solvent and has
some perspectives. However, subject to litigation risks, managers mostly keep the excessive
positivism in the prepared speech in the well proof-read sentences. The abnormal frequency
of negative words becomes alarming one year before bankruptcy and declines a quarter after
to rise again later.
We test now the HB1 hypothesis using the same sample of 50 bankrupt companies and 100
non-bankrupt. The sample includes earnings-announcements-conference-calls for the period
from 2003 to 2009.
Table 2.16 presents the coefficients of OLS regressions, testing how the distance to the
bankruptcy impacts managers’ tone. The basic model has the abnormal negativity on
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the left-hand side. The explanatory variables are distance-from-bankruptcy dummies and
company-performance-variables proven to have an impact on negativity in the previous sec-
tions. Baseline observations are observations for non-bankrupt companies and observations
preceding a bankruptcy by more than 6 quarters. Second model differs in a way that depen-
dent variable is non-adjusted negativity, and to compensate the absence of adjustment we
add controls for each quarter as regressors. Third model estimates the association of “unex-
plained” negativity with distance to bankruptcy and has negativity residuals as a dependent
variable.
[Table 2.16 insert here]
In all three models, the coefficients are statistically significant on the dummies for dis-
tances of 4 and less quarters before the bankruptcy. The coefficients, however, do not increase
monotonously with the shrinking of the distance to the bankruptcy. The largest coefficients
are on the dummies of distances of three and two quarters before the bankruptcy.
Our second hypothesis, the BANCRUPTCY PREDICTABILITY HYPOTHESIS HB2
posits that textual analysis has an incremental information content for bankruptcy predic-
tion when combined with the financial statement information. To test HB2 we develop a
classificatory model using a logistic regression for the accounting ratios. A second classi-
ficatory model uses measure of tone and evasiveness concurrently with accounting ratios.
We test the HB2 on 6 different horizons. We keep one observation for each bankrupt firm
on a specified distance from the bankruptcy. Then we select randomly one observation for
each of non-bankrupt firms in the way that for each quarter in the sample with a bankrupt
observation there are three observations for non-bankrupt companies. The non-bankrupts
companies are selected from S&P 500 list. In our classificatory models we utilize the same
financial ratios used by Altman (1968) in his seminal work:
- Liquidity ratio (LR) = working capital divided by total assets;
- Cumulative profitability ratio (CPR)= retained earnings divided by total assets;
- Return on assets (ROA) = earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets;
- Solvency ratio (SR) = market value of equity divided by the book value of total debt;
- Capital-turnover ratio (CTR) = sales divided by total assets.
Textual analysis explanatory variables are abnormal negativity and quantity of uncertain
words. The regressand is a Bankruptcy dummy equal to 1 if the firm is going to file for
Chapter 11 after the period specified for each regression.
Table 2.17 describes the classification success for both models in six setups with changing
distances from bankruptcy. The percentages of correct classifications and pseudo-R2 pre-
sented are the average values of ten independent trials with randomly selected non-bankrupt
observations.
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[Table 2.17 insert here]
The combined model has a classification accuracy higher than the financial ratio model
alone for any of 6 quarters preceding the bankruptcy. We observe the largest superiority of
the combined model in the period around of one year or three quarters before the bankruptcy.
The incremental information value of textual analysis is the smallest in a last quarter before
a bankruptcy.
If we exclude textual analysis variables from the joint model for the conference call four
quarters before the bankruptcy, we increase average number of classification mistakes by 68%,
while the exclusion of ROA increases mistakes number by 57%, of cumulative profitability
ratio - 55%, of liquidity ratio - 18%, of solvency ratio - 16%, of capital-turnover ratio - 6%.
Median increase of classification mistakes is 80% for exclusion of textual analysis variables;
60% for ROA; 60% for cumulative profitability ratio; 20% for solvency ratio; 10% for liquidity
ratio; and 10% for capital-turnover ratio.
These findings are robust to the use of extensive FinList classification. We reject the null
hypothesis and state that textual analysis appears to contain useful information in addition
to financial data for bankruptcy forecasting.
2.6 Conclusion
We apply textual analysis techniques to the earnings announcements transcripts with
the aim of investigating whether internal information about a company’s future may leak
through the managers’ choice of words. We find that the textual analysis of conference calls
does not require extensive word classifications. Analysis of only the most frequently used
positive and negative words yields the same effects as the use of much more extensive word
lists. Our first significant finding is that the most important factor determining managers’
tone on the earnings-announcement conference call is the difference between the analysts’
expectations and the actual earnings. The change in earnings during the quarter and the
stock returns influence the frequency of negative words used by the managers. That is not,
however, the case for positive words.
Second, we find that Negativity Residuals excessive negativity, which cannot be explained
by past performance are negatively correlated with future earnings. This finding suggests
that, by using a proportion of positive and negative wordings, managers shed light on their
company’s prospects. Analysts fail to incorporate the managers’ tone into their forecasts.
Excessive negativity increases the gap between actual results and analysts’ expectations.
We document that higher negativity is associated with larger uncertainty, as reflected in
the higher frequency of forecast revisions, larger variance in forecasts, and slower analysts’
46
CHAPTER 2
reactions to the earnings announcements. Though our model tested out of sample does
not provide better forecasts than those of financial analysts, it helps to form more justified
expectations by adjusting the analysts’ forecasts.
We analyze several measures of evasive activities which can be undertaken by managers.
We find that the intensity of evasive behavior is positively correlated with the negativity
of the managers’ speech. When answering analysts’ questions, managers change the time
references more often when they have to report poor results and when the analysts’ questions
become more aggressive.
Finally, we study how the managers’ speech changes as a bankruptcy approaches. We
find that significant changes in negativity occur up to 4 quarters before the bankruptcy.
When the tone of managers becomes significantly more negative than that of their peers and
is not justified by their company’s recent performance, bankruptcy can be expected.
Adding textual analysis measures of tone and evasive behavior to classical bankruptcy
prediction model of Altman (1968) we significantly improve our classification abilities.
Summarizing, our results suggest that textual analysis can contribute to the ability to
predict not only market returns, but also physical company performance.
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Short list FinList (extensive classification)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 2.1: Evolution of the managers’ tone before a bankruptcy
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Short list FinList (extensive classification)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 2.2: Tone of future bankrupts compared to average
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Table 2.1: Word classification by groups
We compute the frequencies of all words appearing in managers’ speechs during conference calls
(initial earnings announcements and answers to analysts’ questions). Then, from among the most
frequent words we choose the words belonging to three groups: 1) positive words; 2) negative
words; 3) words of uncertainty. The words appear in the order of frequency of their use, within
their categories.
N Positive Negative Uncertainty/Paltering
1 growth decline think
2 good risks may
3 strong risk expect
4 opportunities loss anticipate
5 opportunity negative believe
6 improvement uncertainties maybe
7 positive difficult compared
8 grow losses guess
9 growing below knowledge
10 improved declined expected
11 improve pressure expectations
12 grew reduce assumptions
13 ability incorrect assume
14 strength decrease assuming
15 gain inaccuracies projections
16 success decreased forecast
17 favorable tough fairly
18 advantage challenging generally
19 outstanding challenges perhaps
20 improving declines roughly
21 improvements volatility reasonable
22 confident weakness plans
23 successful problem efforts
24 stronger lost preliminary
25 comfortable challenge possible
26 excellent slowdown planning
27 nice difficulty expecting
28 confidence problems estimates
29 profitable declining predict
30 attractive negatively forecasting
31 optimistic worse forecasts
32 benefited uncertainty pretty
33 exciting approximately
34 wins might
35 safe wondering
36 successfully enough
37 grown hope
38 strengthen potential
39 encouraging comparison
40 perfect assumption
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Table describes main variables we use in this paper.
Variable Description
Text variables
Words number of words in the presentations or answers to analysts’ ques-
tions;
Phrases number of sentences in the presentations or answers to analysts’
questions;
Negative number of negative words, can be computed for answers or presenta-
tions according to either word classification: our short classification
or FinList offered in Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming);
Positive number of positive words, can be computed for answers or presenta-
tions according to either word classification: our short classification
or FinList offered in Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming);
Uncertain number of uncertain words, can be computed for answers or presen-
tations according to either word classification: our short classifica-
tion or FinList offered in Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming);
Negativity ratio of number of negative words to number of positive words in
the same section of a conference call;
R Past ratio of sentences in the past tense to number of all sentences in
the specific part of a conference call;
R Present ratio of sentences in the present tense to number of all sentences in
the specific part of a conference call;
R Future ratio of sentences in the future tense to number of all sentences in
the specific part of a conference call;
Switch from past share of analysts’ questions oriented toward the past which get an
answer oriented toward the future or present;
Switch to past share of analysts’ questions oriented toward future or present which
get an answer oriented toward the past.
Company performance
Capital gain stock return over the period from previous earnings announcement;
∆Earnings change in earnings scaled by share price;
Surprise difference between actual earnings and average of analysts’ forecasts
issued in 30 days before earnings announcement, scaled by the stock
price;
Earnings quarterly earnings per share announced in the conference call.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Table presents summary statistics for all variables described in table 2.2.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Speech length
Words Presentations 3923.909 1658.64 5 18094
Words Answers 3986.422 1567.314 22 21371
Phrases Presentations 168.988 73.114 1 819
Phrases Answers 179.59 72.274 2 958
Negative words
Negative Presentations 16.856 13.14 0 170
Negative Presentations F inList 32.041 22.749 0 447
Negative Answers 8.851 6.937 0 150
Negative Answers F inList 30.322 17.605 0 445
Positive words
Positive Presentations 56.832 34.272 0 296
Positive Presentations F inList 65.607 36.301 0 332
Positive Answers 36.57 20.055 0 191
Positive Answers F inList 45.684 23.109 0 276
Negativity
Negativity Presentations 0.391 0.411 0 8
Negativity Presentations F inList 0.587 0.475 0 12
Negativity Answers 0.304 0.335 0 10
Negativity Answers F inList 0.789 0.744 0 41
Uncertainty words
Uncertainty Presentations 37.979 20.017 0 188
Uncertainty Presentations F inList 26.054 14.805 0 204
Uncertainty Answers 61.081 29.153 0 295
Uncertainty Answers F inList 28.497 15.458 0 201
Frequency of tense change
Switch from past 0.433 0.203 0 1
Switch to past 0.112 0.071 0 1
Company performance
Capital gain 0.067 0.805 -0.987 55.653
∆Earnings -0.006 0.37 -27.196 2.318
Absolute Surprise, unscaled 0.092 0.715 0 58.747
Positive surprise, unscaled 0.065 0.127 0 2.82
Negative surprise, unscaled -0.165 1.33 -58.747 0
Surprise -0.004 0.299 -27.452 0.324
Earnings 0.572 1.005 -68.400 8.790
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Table 2.6: Negative and positive frequencies.
This table presents the results of estimation of the following OLS regressions, explaining
the frequency of positive and negative words in different sections of a conference call by the
company’s performance.
Word frequencyt = Const+ β1Capital gaint,t−1 + β2∆Earningst,t−1 + β3Surprise decilet+
+β4Market returnt,t−1 + 
where Word frequencyt is the number of words of specific category (positive, negative,
uncertain) per 100 words in the conference call section. Capital gaint,t−1 is the change in
stock price computed as the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement, minus
stock price 5 trading days after the preceding quarter announcement, scaled by the later;
∆Earningst,t−1 is the difference in actual EPS and previous quarter EPS, scaled by the
price 5 days before earnings announcement; Surpriset is an earnings surprise - the difference
between actual earnings in quarter t and average analysts’ forecast 30 days preceding the
earnings announcement, scaled by the stock price 5 trading days before the announcement.
When the firm underperforms expectations and surprise is negative, the Surprise decile
will take values from -5 (for largest surprises) to -1 (smallest negative surprises). Positive
surprises are divided into quintiles as well, and Surprise decile for positive surprises takes
values from 1 to 5.
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Frequency
Presentations Answers Questions
Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
Capital gaint,t−1 -0.018*** 0.014 -0.007** 0.002 -0.007** 0.003
(-4.721) (1.632) (-3.272) (0.333) (-2.830) (0.615)
∆Earningst,t−1 -0.164** 0.150 -0.055 0.111 -0.057 0.058
(-2.895) (1.164) (-1.811) (1.427) (-1.461) (0.784)
Surprise decilet -0.018*** 0.024*** -0.005*** 0.014*** -0.008*** 0.013***
(-18.228) (10.640) (-9.122) (10.532) (-11.855) (9.694)
Market returnt−1,t -0.406*** 0.174* -0.152*** 0.168*** -0.229*** 0.178***
(-12.214) (2.290) (-8.586) (3.678) (-9.586) (3.930)
Constant 0.459*** 1.415*** 0.229*** 0.898*** 0.255*** 0.704***
(140.696) (190.009) (131.825) (200.737) (110.682) (161.135)
N 8177 8177 8177 8177 7785 7785
adj R2 0.0675 0.0157 0.0236 0.0163 0.0345 0.0149
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.7: Negative and positive frequencies: extended classification
This table is analogous to Table 2.6 with the only difference being that here the Negativity is
computed based on the word classification offered by Loughran and McDonald (forthcoming).
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Frequency
Presentations Answers Questions
Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive
Capital gaint,t−1 -0.025*** 0.011 -0.013** -0.000 -0.016* 0.004
(-3.920) (1.421) (-2.609) (-0.039) (-2.257) (0.756)
∆Earningst,t−1 -0.229* 0.096 -0.130 0.094 -0.130 0.054
(-2.444) (0.799) (-1.713) (1.119) (-1.242) (0.722)
Surprise decilet -0.032*** 0.027*** -0.013*** 0.016*** -0.017*** 0.014***
(-19.618) (12.992) (-9.939) (10.972) (-9.314) (10.440)
Market returnt−1,t -0.663*** 0.209** -0.578*** 0.192*** -0.405*** 0.141**
(-12.040) (2.957) (-13.192) (3.952) (-6.500) (3.161)
Constant 0.866*** 1.622*** 0.790*** 1.137*** 1.230*** 0.817***
(160.269) (234.054) (184.661) (239.965) (203.884) (189.469)
N 8198 8198 8543 8543 8184 8184
adj R2 0.0712 0.0228 0.0362 0.0167 0.0183 0.0152
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.9: Switches.
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, explaining the frequency of switching the
tenses in Q&A sessions. The dependent variable in regressions 1 and 3 is the share of the
questions oriented toward the present or future and getting the answer oriented toward the
past, among all future or present-oriented questions. The dependent variable in regressions
2 and 4 is the share of the questions oriented toward the past which get answers oriented
toward the future or present, among all past-oriented questions. Explanatory variables are
firm- and market-performance characteristics, as well as analysts’ Negativity (number of
negative words to the number of positive words in the analysts questions).
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Share or answers with switched tense
Short classification FinList classification
1 2 3 4
To Past From Past To Past From Past
Capital gaint,t−1 0.002* -0.001 0.003** -0.001
(2.509) (-0.208) (2.665) (-0.147)
∆Earningst,t−1 0.008 -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.548) (-0.098) (0.383) (0.109)
Surprise decilet -0.001* 0.001 -0.000 0.001
(-1.980) (1.407) (-1.472) (1.163)
Market returnt−1,t 0.031*** 0.048 0.028** 0.024
(3.436) (1.871) (3.097) (0.761)
Questions negativityt 0.013*** -0.037*** 0.010*** -0.018***
(5.372) (-5.351) (7.400) (-3.639)
Constant 0.108*** 0.446*** 0.102*** 0.450***
(93.116) (133.146) (72.439) (89.354)
N 7746 7746 8047 8045
adj R2 0.0059 0.0045 0.0085 0.0016
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Table 2.10: Correlations table: paltering measures and previous results.
This table presents paired correlations of paltering measures and companies’ performance.
Uncertainty freq is the frequency of uncertain words in the conference call; Dif AP is the
absolute difference between manager’s Negativity in the prepared presentation and impro-
vised answers; Past P and Past A are the proportions of the sentences formulated in the
past tense in the presentations and answers respectively. From past and To past are the
proportions of questions in a specific tense when managers decide to answer in a different
tense, over all questions using this tense.
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Variables NegativityP NegativityA ∆Earnings Surprise decile Capital gain
Uncertainty freq 0.07*** 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02
Dif AP 0.73*** 0.53*** -0.03** -0.17*** -0.02
Past P 0.16*** 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 0.01
Past A 0.09*** 0.12*** -0.01 -0.04*** -0.00
From past -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.02 0.03** -0.01
To past 0.02** 0.05*** -0.00 -0.02 0.00
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.11: Paltering and market efficiency.
The dependent variables are 1) Revision frequency in the following quarter (number of
revisions, scaled by the number of analysts); 2) Variance of analysts’ forecasts outstanding
at the end of following quarter; 3) Percentage of analysts covering the firm in the following
quarter who react within one working day after the earnings announcement. Indexes P
and A relate the variable to the presentation part of a call or to the manager’s answers
respectively. Dif AP is the absolute difference in negativity of presentation and answers;
Dif sign AP is a dummy variable equal to one when negativity of answers is greater than
negativity of presentations. Length P is the logarithm of the number of sentences in the
presentations. Frequencies of past tense in the speech (Past P and PastA) are expressed in
percentages.
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses
Short list Extensive list
Revisions Freq Variance Reaction Revisions Freq Variance Reaction
From past 0.071*** -0.009 -0.034* 0.062** -0.011 -0.030*
(3.382) (-0.621) (-2.540) (2.936) (-0.802) (-2.210)
Past P -0.205*** 0.031 0.160*** -0.141** 0.079* 0.122***
(-3.778) (0.852) (4.600) (-2.615) (2.197) (3.527)
Past A 0.023 0.029 -0.172** 0.126 0.044 -0.235***
(0.276) (0.517) (-3.230) (1.540) (0.800) (-4.441)
LengthP 0.010 0.010 -0.014 0.029* 0.018* -0.033***
(0.864) (1.235) (-1.921) (2.559) (2.405) (-4.525)
Market returnt−1,t -0.598*** -0.153*** 0.205*** -0.619*** -0.180*** 0.217***
(-11.078) (-4.261) (5.904) (-11.443) (-4.977) (6.229)
Uncertainty freq -0.080*** -0.008 0.048*** -0.036 0.028 -0.032
(-4.730) (-0.727) (4.416) (-1.422) (1.679) (-1.946)
Dif AP 0.003 -0.113*** 0.032* 0.014 -0.061*** 0.021*
(0.155) (-7.550) (2.204) (0.908) (-5.949) (2.158)
Dif sign AP -0.000 0.017* 0.023** -0.012 0.009 0.007
(-0.036) (2.192) (3.010) (-0.890) (1.070) (0.809)
Negativity P 0.136*** 0.197*** -0.093*** 0.095*** 0.085*** -0.072***
(6.825) (14.949) (-7.277) (6.970) (9.313) (-8.173)
Negativity A 0.076*** 0.093*** -0.117*** 0.012 0.068*** -0.039***
(3.912) (7.189) (-9.372) (0.827) (6.879) (-4.151)
Constant 0.521*** -0.084* 0.539*** 0.381*** -0.153*** 0.759***
(10.280) (-2.494) (10.168) (8.266) (-4.965) (15.481)
N 7283 7171 7283 7300 7188 7300
adjR2 0.0452 0.0602 0.0519 0.0353 0.0443 0.0404
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.12: Predicting future earnings.
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, explaining earnings in the next quarter by past
performance of the company and the market. The full model (column 6) looks as follows:
Earningst+1 = Const+ β1Earningst + β2Earningst−1 + β3Surprise decilet+
+ β4Market returnt + β5NRPt × SignDummyP + β6NRPt × (1− SignDummyP )+
+ β7NRAt × SignDummyA + β8NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) + β8Consensust,t+1 + 
where Surpriset is an earnings surprise - the difference between actual earnings in quarter t and
average analysts’ forecast in the 30 days preceding the earnings announcement, scaled by the
stock price 5 trading days before the announcement. When the firm underperforms expectations
and surprise is negative, the Surprise decile will take values from -5 (for largest negative sur-
prises) to -1 (smallest negative surprises). Positive surprises are divided into quintiles as well, and
Surprise decile for positive surprises takes values from 1 to 5. Negativity residualst are residuals
of the following regression estimated on preceding data with firm fixed-effects.
Negativityt = C + β1Capital gaint + β2∆Earningst + β3Surprise decilet + β4Market returnt
Analysts consensust,t+1 is the average forecast for quarter t+ 1 earnings outstanding on the third
day after the earnings announcement of quarter t.
To make adjusted R2 comparable, all regressions are run on the same set of observations (for which
all parameters are defined).
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-statistics
are in parentheses
Earningst+1
1 2 3 4 5 6
Earningst 0.444*** 0.428*** 0.234*** 0.192***
(21.003) (20.292) (8.375) (6.893)
Earningst−1 0.419*** 0.428*** 0.355*** 0.359***
(20.545) (21.130) (17.031) (17.426)
Surprise decilet 0.023*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 0.025***
(5.542) (4.592) (7.145) (6.112)
Market returnt 0.685*** 0.609*** 0.657*** 0.562***
(5.537) (4.951) (5.398) (4.664)
NRPt × SignDummyP -0.265*** -0.409*** -0.305***
(-6.237) (-9.357) (-7.303)
NRPt × (1− SignDummyP ) -0.143 0.090 -0.091
(-1.186) (0.723) (-0.772)
NRAt × SignDummyA -0.150* -0.337*** -0.217***
(-2.458) (-5.298) (-3.610)
NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) 0.190 0.304 0.168
(1.237) (1.892) (1.113)
Consensust,t+1 0.885*** 0.888*** 0.377*** 0.418***
(42.169) (43.029) (11.272) (12.533)
Constant 0.031 0.084** 0.011 0.122*** -0.057** 0.003
(1.708) (2.934) (0.559) (4.174) (-2.963) (0.097)
N 3667 3667 3667 3667 3667 3667
adj R2 0.4000 0.4110 0.3265 0.3542 0.4200 0.4351
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 61
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Table 2.13: Predicting future earnings with extended list.
This table presents the results of OLS regressions, explaining earnings in the next quarter by past
performance of the company and the market. The full model (column 4) looks as follows:
Earningst+1 = Const+ β1Earningst + β2Earningst−1 + β3Surprise decilet+
+ β4Market returnt + β5NRPt × SignDummyP + β6NRPt × (1− SignDummyP )+
+ β7NRAt × SignDummyA + β8NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) + β8Consensust,t+1 + 
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-statistics
are in parentheses.
Earningst+1
1 2 3 4 5 6
Earningst 0.497*** 0.478*** 0.251*** 0.199***
(24.628) (23.786) (9.180) (7.322)
Earningst−1 0.340*** 0.344*** 0.283*** 0.282***
(18.640) (19.071) (15.435) (15.605)
Surprise decilet 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.028*** 0.023***
(4.951) (3.707) (6.974) (5.712)
Market returnt 0.767*** 0.684*** 0.735*** 0.633***
(6.218) (5.584) (6.086) (5.311)
NRPt × SignDummyP -0.224*** -0.399*** -0.275***
(-5.614) (-9.888) (-7.067)
NRPt × (1− SignDummyP ) -0.018 0.122 0.013
(-0.218) (1.424) (0.157)
NRAt × SignDummyA -0.142*** -0.206*** -0.165***
(-4.522) (-6.401) (-5.414)
NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) 0.094 0.135 0.076
(1.204) (1.682) (0.994)
Consensust,t+1 0.906*** 0.901*** 0.433*** 0.482***
(43.394) (44.279) (13.099) (14.707)
Constant 0.045* 0.129*** -0.009 0.127*** -0.063** 0.025
(2.548) (4.801) (-0.452) (4.597) (-3.284) (0.924)
N 3829 3829 3829 3829 3829 3829
adj R2 0.3884 0.4015 0.3296 0.3658 0.4145 0.4335
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.14: Negativity residuals, uncertainty and forecast errors.
WAFE is the absolute forecast error winsorized at top 1% observations.
FE is the forecast error - scaled difference between theaverage of all forecasts outstanding 3 days
after previous quarter earnings announcement and the actual earnings.
All errors are scaled by the stock price.
NRP and NRA are negativity residuals for presentations and answers, respectively.
Revision frequency refers to the number of forecast revisions during the quarter, scaled by the
number of analysts covering the firm in this quarter.
By the stars, we denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-
statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Classification of most frequently used words
WAFE FE
1 2 3 4
NRPt × SignDummyP 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(12.876) (13.909) (8.514) (9.023)
NRPt × (1− SignDummyP ) 0.005*** 0.004** 0.000 0.000
(3.523) (2.886) (0.141) (0.305)
NRAt × SignDummyA 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(5.942) (6.005) (6.390) (6.889)
NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.580) (-1.800) (-1.434) (-1.545)
Market returnt+1 -0.004** -0.006***
(-3.267) (-3.896)
Revision Frequencyt+1 0.003*** 0.003***
(10.081) (9.589)
Constant 0.004*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.002***
(12.996) (3.002) (0.364) (-6.134)
N 3667 3260 3667 3260
adj R2 0.0902 0.1585 0.0437 0.1060
Panel B: Extensive word classification - FinList
WAFE FE
1 2 3 4
NRPt × SignDummyP 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(14.592) (14.845) (8.892) (9.210)
NRPt × (1− SignDummyP ) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.532) (0.854) (0.229) (0.104)
NRAt × SignDummyA 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(6.086) (6.345) (4.553) (4.676)
NRAt × (1− SignDummyA) -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(-0.182) (0.054) (-0.922) (-0.132)
Market returnt+1 -0.006*** -0.006***
(-4.039) (-3.750)
Revision Frequencyt+1 0.003*** 0.004***
(9.205) (9.494)
Constant 0.004*** 0.001** 0.000 -0.002***
(11.753) (2.608) (0.757) (-5.359)
N 3829 3395 3829 3395
adj R2 0.1048 0.1649 0.0416 0.0961
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 63
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Table 2.15: Mean forecasts errors classified by the size of negativity resid-
uals.
This table summarizes the mean analyst errors for the different groups we form, based on the size
of negativity residuals in the presentations. We create three equal-sized groups for positive and
negative residuals - 6 groups overall.
The forecast error is:
FEt =
(Consensus forecastt−1,t −Actualt)
Pricet−1
where Consensus forecastt−1,t is an average of all analysts’ forecasts for the quarter t outstanding
on the third day after earnings announcement of quarter t− 1; Actualt are earnings announced in
quarter t. Absolute forecast error is:
AFE = |FE|
WAFE is a winsorized absolute forecast error with top 1% observations replaced.
Revision frequency refers to the number of forecast revisions during the quarter, scaled by the
number of analysts covering the firm in this quarter.
Revision frequency =
Number of revisions
Number of analysts
Panel A reports the results we get using the short positive/negative words list containing the most
frequently used words only. Panel B reports the results, using the extensive word classification.
Panel A: Most frequently used words classification
Negative residuals Positive residuals
1 2 3 1 2 3
Residuals interval [-0.49;-0.23) [-0.23;-0.13) [-0.13;-0] [+0;0.11] (0.11;0.36] (0.36;6.77]
Mean FE 0.0010 0.0008 0.0005 0.0023 0.0042 0.0204
Mean AFE 0.0027 0.0041 0.0046 0.0049 0.0101 0.0276
Mean WAFE 0.0027 0.0033 0.0035 0.0046 0.0068 0.0111
Observations number 818 819 786 443 443 415
Mean of positive FE 0.0054 0.0073 0.0072 0.0084 0.0155 0.0472
Mean of negative FE -0.0013 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0055 -0.0073
% of positive errors 34.35 33.70 35.88 43.12 46.05 50.84
Mean Revision Freq 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.48 0.59 0.62
Panel B: Extensive word classification
1 2 3 1 2 3
Residuals interval [-3.61;-0.29) [-0.29;-0.16) [-0.16;-0] [+0;0.15] (0.15;0.43] (0.43;5.69]
Mean FE 0.0012 0.0003 0.0000 0.0017 0.0026 0.0330
Mean AFE 0.0037 0.0034 0.0042 0.0068 0.0070 0.0399
Mean WAFE 0.0030 0.0032 0.0036 0.0050 0.0062 0.0128
Observations number 842 837 813 482 458 445
Mean of positive FE 0.0071 0.0054 0.0059 0.0099 0.0111 0.0649
Mean of negative FE -0.0018 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0078
% of positive errors 35.15 34.53 36.29 42.74 43.01 56.18
Mean Revision Freq 0.4112 0.3916 0.4240 0.4914 0.5378 0.6518
64
CHAPTER 2
Table 2.16: Impact of approaching bankruptcy on the manager’s tone.
This table presents the estimates of a regression explaining negativity in the presentations, or neg-
ativity residuals (NRP ), by the firm’s performance and its distance to the bankruptcy. Distancei
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of quarters before the bankruptcy is equal to i and
0 otherwise. The baseline cases are those starting more than 6 quarters before the bankruptcy.
Sample includes observations both of bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies.
The stars denote the significance levels of less than 5% (*), 1% (**) and 0.1% (***). t-statistics
are in parentheses.
short classification extensive classification
1 2 3 4 5 6
Abn negativity Negativity NRP Abn negativity Negativity NRP
Surprise decile -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.048*** -0.050***
(-13.836) (-13.899) (-16.023) (-16.257)
Market return 0.343*** 0.291 0.359** -0.119
(3.389) (0.948) (3.221) (-0.369)
Capital gain -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.012
(-1.192) (-1.249) (-1.576) (-1.577)
∆Earnings -0.104* -0.099* -0.073 -0.067
(-2.438) (-2.318) (-1.468) (-1.345)
Distance 1 0.808*** 0.827*** 1.036*** 0.464** 0.486** 0.659***
(5.615) (5.731) (5.938) (2.949) (3.080) (3.912)
Distance 2 1.032*** 1.039*** 1.352*** 0.814*** 0.838*** 1.141***
(7.671) (7.693) (8.059) (5.188) (5.321) (6.532)
Distance 3 1.167*** 1.226*** 1.621*** 0.972*** 1.020*** 1.409***
(8.394) (8.783) (9.281) (6.005) (6.274) (7.743)
Distance 4 0.485*** 0.482*** 0.548** 0.253 0.252 0.322
(3.375) (3.342) (3.269) (1.456) (1.442) (1.770)
Distance 5 0.212 0.215 0.285 -0.041 -0.023 0.038
(1.425) (1.438) (1.634) (-0.244) (-0.137) (0.215)
Distance 6 0.194 0.181 0.294 -0.065 -0.072 0.035
(1.301) (1.210) (1.611) (-0.374) (-0.410) (0.185)
Time controls X X X X
Constant -0.009 0.562*** 0.092* 0.034*** 0.826*** -0.019
(-0.938) (9.382) (2.041) (3.331) (16.310) (-0.356)
N 3496 3496 2339 4434 4434 4284
adj R2 0.1092 0.1529 0.0977 0.0758 0.1020 0.0391
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 2.17: Predicting bankruptcy with logistic regressions.
The table compare the classification accuracy achieved with the logistic model based on accounting
ratios only, and the model which includes textual analysis data. We report the percentage of
correctly specified observations in two categories: bankrupts and non-bankrupts, as well as overall
score. The other measure we compute to assess the quality of two models is a pseudo − R2. The
values in the table are the average results obtained in 10 random trials. The classification success
depends on the sample selection, thus we have run the regressions on 10 different samples. The
number of non-bankrupt companies in each sample is 3 times larger than the number of bankrupt
firms.
Panel C shows the difference between values in Panel B and Panel A.
Classification accuracy (Cut Point=0.5)
Panel A: Accounting ratios model
6 5 4 3 2 1
Bankrupts 60% 59.7% 74% 76.3% 64.8% 78.1%
Non-bankrupts 94.7% 94.9% 95.6% 93.8% 95.9% 97.7%
Total 86.2% 86% 90.2% 89.5% 88.2% 92.7%
Pseudo R2 0.456 0.470 0.619 0.616 0.511 0.648
Panel B: Joint accounting ratios and speech analysis model
6 5 4 3 2 1
Bankrupts 70 72.4 86.8 87.6 76 81.7
Non-bankrupts 95.2 95.3 97.5 97 96.4 97.3
Total 88.9 89.6 94.8 94.7 91.3 93.1
Pseudo R2 0.559 0.582 0.740 0.782 0.598 0.714
Panel C: Differences between two models
6 5 4 3 2 1
Bankrupts 10 12.7 12.8 11.3 11.2 3.6
Non-bankrupts 0.5 0.4 1.9 3.2 0.5 -0.4
Total 2.7 3.6 4.6 5.2 3.1 0.4
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.112 0.121 0.166 0.087 0.066
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Signaling Attenuation Effect and
Sell-side Analysts
This paper investigates how managers can benefit from timely and active coverage by sell-
side analysts. Selling insiders’ shares is deemed by the market as a bad signal, and it is in the
interest of managers to diminish the negative impact this actions might have on shares’ value.
I find that companies with timely and intensive analyst coverage experience lower market
reaction in response to insider sales. My findings are consistent with Kelly and Ljungqvist
(2007) who find that analysts coverage improves market efficiency. By improving market
efficiency or making investors believe in higher informational efficiency, sell-side analysts’
coverage cushions the effect of negative signals. Managers, as if they were aware of this fact
or as if they also believe in stronger efficiency caused by more active coverage, are more likely
to sell their shares when their earnings announcements are actively followed by analysts.
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3.1 Introduction
One of advantages of efficient markets for the managers is the absence of signaling con-
straint. In the real world, managers have to consider how the markets can react to their
actions, when taking decisions on company financing or rebalancing their own portfolios.
The necessity to avoid actions capable to seem to markets a bad signal, may lead to subopti-
mal decisions. Ross (1977) brought up signaling issues in capital structure decisions. Myers
and Majluf (1984) builds a model showing that firms may pass up valuable investment op-
portunities, being constrained by signaling effect of equity issue. Fama and Jensen (1983)
discusses how insider trading provides negative signal to the market.
I argue that if investors at some point of time believe in transparency of a particu-
lar company (deservedly or not), they would concentrate their signal-interpreting endeavor
elsewhere and managers would benefit from greater flexibility in their decision. The prob-
lem of investors’ limited attention is discussed by Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (forthcoming),
who find that investors’ ability to interpret the news is limited and too many news lead
to under-reaction. This explains why investors would neglect signals from companies they
judge transparent and concentrate their efforts on more opaque firms.
I hypothesize that timely and active sell-side analysis makes investors less sensitive to
the signals as it either improves market efficiency or makes the markets believe in greater
efficiency. Despite the fact that reputation of sell-side analysts was harmed by numerous
scandals in recent years and many papers have been written on the conflict of interest
problems they face, investors still use their reports for financial decisions. Zhang (2008) finds
that analysts play the role of information conductors: the immediate reaction of financial
analysts to company earnings announcements increases the market reaction in the event
window and decreases the post-earnings announcement drift. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007)
explore the links between analyst research, informational efficiency, and asset prices. They
establish that exogenous reductions in analysts’ coverage are followed by less efficient pricing
and lower liquidity; greater earnings surprises and more volatile trading around subsequent
earnings announcements; increases in required returns; and reduced return volatility. These
findings confirm that analysts’ coverage generally improves informational efficiency.
My empirical results support my hypothesis. I find that timely and intensive coverage of
company’s earnings announcements attenuate the market reaction to such negative signals
as insider sales. Therefore, managers are less constrained by signaling issues if they arrange
intensive sell-side coverage of the company. Insiders, as if they are aware of this phenom-
ena, are more likely to sell their shares after earnings announcements with timely forecast
revisions. The effect persists controlling for market reaction to earnings announcement and
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company size and is valid for earnings surprises with positive, as with negative surprises.
The paper is structured as follows: in the chapter 2 I discuss methods and data, chapter
3 presents the results and chapter 4 concludes.
3.2 Methods and data
The more efficient the market, the less investors need to pay attention to the behavior
of managers and to search for potential signals. The active and timely coverage of financial
analysts improves market efficiency and also gives to investors the feeling of greater infor-
mational transparency. These observations lead me to formulate the following hypothesis.
H1 - Signal attenuation hypothesis: When the coverage of the firm is timely and active,
the market reaction to negative signals is weaker.
If managers share my belief expressed in H1, they would try to profit from active and
timely analysts’ following and undertake more frequently the negative-signal-actions when
they get better coverage. Thus comes the second hypothesis:
H2. Managers flexibility hypothesis: Being less constraint by signaling problems, man-
agers are more likely to undertake a ”negative signal” action when company is effectively
covered by analysts.
I test the hypotheses described above on the cases of most famous and frequent category
of negative signals - insider trading. I use I/B/E/S for the data on earnings announcements
and analysts forecasts, CRSP for prices and returns information, Thomsons Reuters for SEO
and insider trading data. The sample covers 10 years from January 1998 to December 2008.
I exclude from analysis companies with stocks cheaper than a dollar, as well as companies
which could not be uniquely identified in all three databases.
Under Rule 10b5-1, the SEC defines illegal insider trading as any securities transaction
made when the person behind the trade is aware of nonpublic material information. Some
companies pre-announce insider trades schedule to avoid both legal persecution and signaling
problems. In this case the insider trade can happen on any day scheduled in advance, but
this practice reduces managers’ flexibility. Those managers who do not announce insider sale
schedules are legally bound to sell during the period of time with minimal uncertainty in the
market. As the law considers the quarterly earnings to be nonpublic material information,
it moved most of unscheduled insider trades to the “safety zone” - days following earnings
announcements (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000)).
In this paper I consider the insider sales taking place in two weeks following the earnings
announcement.
69
CHAPTER 3
The forecast revisions are mostly needed when there are important company news an-
nounced. That’s why I proxy the quality of coverage by analysts’ reaction to the earnings
announcements.
The important parameter influencing both the analysts’ reaction and the willingness
of managers to sell their shares is the earnings surprise - the unexpected component of
the earnings announced. To compute earnings surprise I use the method recommended by
Kothari (2001), used in Dellavigna and Pollet (2009).
The earnings surprise for an announcement is the difference between actual earnings for
the quarter recorded in I/B/E/S and the mean analyst forecast included in the I/B/E/S
detail file during 30 days before the quarterly earnings announcement, scaled by the stock
price 5 trading days before the announcement.
Let et,j be the earnings announced for the company j at quarter t and eˆt,j be the corre-
sponding consensus forecast. Let denote by Pt,j the price of shares of company j 5 trading
days before the announcement in quarter t. The earnings surprise st, j is
st,j =
et,j − eˆt,j
Pt,j
(3.1)
I arrange all earnings surprises into 11 groups. Group 0 corresponds to earnings surprise
equal to 0. Groups 1 to 5 corresponds to quintiles of positive surprises. I assign groups -1 to
-5 to quintiles of negative surprises. -5 corresponds to the largest in absolute value negative
surprise.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics.
[Table 3.1 insert here]
Tables 3.2 summarizes market reaction to insider sales by analysts responsiveness to the
earnings announcements, and 3.3 provides reference on number of how the trade size relates
to analysts responsiveness.
[Table 3.2 insert here]
[Table 3.3 insert here]
The average market reaction to insider sale grows with larger share sold. The larger is
analysts reaction during a week after the earnings announcement, the weaker is the reaction
of the market to insider sale. The intersection of the size of share sold and intensity of
analysts’ response provides mixed evidence.
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3.3 Main results
To test my first hypothesis I estimate the following OLS model.
CARISijt = α + β1First day responseit + β2First week responseit + β3Share sold+
+β4First day responseit × Share sold+ β5First week responseit × Share sold+
β6 × Cap decileit + β7Total analystsi(t+1) +
10∑
n=1
γn × Surprise groupit
(3.2)
where :
- CARISijt is cumulative abnormal return for stock i in the window around the insider sale j after
announcement of quarter t results expressed in percentages;
- First day response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts for the firm i within two
days from the announcement of quarter t earnings ([0;1] time interval);
- First week response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts for the firm i in the first
week after announcement of quarter t earnings, but not in the first two days ([2;5] interval);
- Total analysts is the number of analysts covering the firm i in the quarter t+ 1;
- Cap decileit is a decile (computed for each year) of firm’s i capitalization;
- Share soldijt is the percantage of shares sold among the shares outstanding.
The coefficients of interest are those on the analysts’ response variables: First week response
and First day response, and on interaction terms of analysts’ reaction with percentage of
shares sold. I include the percentage of shares sold Share soldijt into regression to take into
consideration the magnitude of insider sale happened. To control for the size and public
interest to the company I use the number of analysts covering the firm and the decile of
firm’s capitalization. The necessity to introduce into regression the size of earnings surprise
is dictated by possible post-earnings announcement drift, as I study the insider trades which
happens after the earnings announcement. I include into the model dummies for earnings
surprise group.
The estimation results are in Table 3.4
[Table 3.4 insert here]
The timeliness of analysts reaction to the earnings announcements is positively correlated
with cumulative abnormal returns around the day when the insider trade takes place. This
mean that analysts’ activity attenuate the negative reaction to insider sale.
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One standard deviation increase in the number of analysts reacting immediately on the
earnings announcement results in decrease of market reaction by 0.53%. While one standard
deviation increase in the number of analysts reacting in the following week after the earnings
announcement results decreases market reaction by 0.43%.
Firms may vary in real or perceived transparency for reasons independent of analysts’
coverage. Transparent firms associated with less reaction at the time of insider sales can
also attract higher analyst activity. For example, it may be easier to provide more accu-
rate forecasts on their earnings. In this case the effect documented in Table 3.4 might be
driven simultaneously by firm’s inherent transparency. To avoid this potential explanation
I introduce into the model the firm fixed effects. The results are in the Table 3.5.
[Table 3.5 insert here]
The significance of analysts’ coverage explaining market reaction holds when fixed effects
are introduced.
To test H2 whether managers are more prone to sell their stocks after earnings announce-
ments with timely and active coverage, I estimate the following logit model.
P (Insider Saleit = 1) = Φ(c+ α1 ×Response dummyit + α2 × First day responseit+
α3 × First week responseit + β × Cap decileit + γ × CARE decileit
+
10∑
n=1
δn × Surprise groupit +
10∑
n=1
µn × Surprise groupit ×Response dummyit)
(3.3)
where :
- Insider Saleit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if insiders of firm i sell shares in two weeks after
earnings announcement for quarter t;
- Response dummyit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one financial analyst revises his
forecast for the firm i in the window [0;1], where day 0 is the day of earnings announcement for
quarter t;
- First day responseit is a number of financial analysts who revise forecasts for the firm i in the
window [0;1], where day 0 is the day of earnings announcement for quarter t;
- First week responseit is a number of financial analysts who revise forecasts for the firm i in the
window [2;7], where day 0 is the day of earnings announcement for quarter t;
- Cap decileit is a decile (computed for each year) of firm’s i capitalization;
- CAR decileit is a decile of cumulative abnormal return for the stock i in the window [0;1] around
earnings announcement for quarter t.
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results for four models.
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[Table 3.6 insert here]
Table 3.7 shows the marginal effects for these four estimations.
[Table 3.7 insert here]
I find that analysts responsiveness to earnings announcement is positively correlated with
the likelihood of insider sales. The effect of analysts’ responsiveness depends on the news
communicated on the earnings announcement. For the positive news coverage effects on
likelihood to sell is stronger.
The marginal effects reveal that earnings announcement has a 5% higher likelihood to be
followed by insider sell if analysts react to the earnings announcement immediately. Each
additional analysts revising a forecast on a first day after earnings announcement add further
1%.
One possible concern is that the willingness of managers to sell is not dictated by the
coverage per se, but by the market reaction to the earlier earnings announcement news,
which is stronger when analysts intervene. I include CAREA decile as a control variable to
dismiss this concern. The following graphs illustrates that the observed phenomena can not
be fully explained by the effect of analysts’ reaction on the price.
Figure 3.1 demonstrate the dependence of insider trades on earnings surprise and analysts’
responsiveness. For reference I present 3.2 illustrating frequencies of insider purchases.
[Figure 3.1 insert here]
[Figure 3.2 insert here]
For negative surprises, timely reaction of the analysts coincides with or/and cause stronger
price movement down. Thus, if the managers preferences to sell or not are determined by the
price mostly, the managers should be less prone to sell after negatives surprise when earnings
surprise is negative. Inversely, for positive surprises managers should sell more when analysts
are active.
In fact, we see on the Figure 3.1 that the line depicting frequency of insider sales for timely
covered companies is always above the line for non-timely covered companies. However, the
gap between two lines shrinks on the zone of negative surprises, which is consistent with the
logic of price influencing managers’ decision.
On the Figure 3.2 we see that for insider purchases (which do not usually play any
signaling roles) two lines intersects and behave consistently with the price-driven decision
making.
73
CHAPTER 3
3.4 Conclusion
I reflect on the commonly accepted idea that sell-side analysts improve market efficiency,
and investigate the possible consequences of investors and managers believing in this argu-
ment. The more market is efficient, the less it makes sense to trade based on so-called signals
- interpretations of managers’ activities. I hypothesize that a manager gets greater flexibility
in his actions when his company is timely and extensively covered by financial analysts. I
use the sample of the most frequent negative signals - insider sales - to investigate how the
magnitude of market reaction to the signal correlates with the quality of coverage. I find
that the market reaction to insider sale is weaker when the firm’s earnings announcement
gets a more active and timely coverage. Insiders, aware of this phenomena or believing in
greater market efficiency brought in by the analysts, are more likely to sell their shares af-
ter earnings announcements with timely forecast revisions. The effect persists controlling
for market reaction to earnings announcements and company size and is valid for earnings
surprises with positive, as with negative surprises.
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Figure 3.1: Insiders’ sale after earnings announcement
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Figure 3.2: Insiders’ purchase after earnings announcement
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Table 3.2: Summary of market reaction to insider sales by analysts respon-
siveness to the earnings announcements
This tables presents summary statistics for the market reaction to insider trades following after
earnings announcements. Panel A classifies the insider trades by analysts’ reaction during a day
after the earnings announcement.
Panel B classifies the insider trades by analysts’ reaction during a week after the earnings announce-
ment, but after the first day.
Panel C classifies the insider trades by total analysts’ reaction during a week after the earnings
announcement.
First day response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts on earnings announcement
day or on the next day;
First week response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts in the first week after earn-
ings announcement, but not on the earnings announcement day or the next day;
Total response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts in the first week after earnings
announcement,
CARIS [−1; 5] is cumulative abnormal return in the [-1;5] window where day 0 is the day of the
insider sale.
Panel A: summary for CARIS[−1; 5] by response to EA in [-1;1] window
First day response 0 1 [2;3] [4;7] [8;37]
Mean -0.0029 -0.0038 -0.0041 -0.0027 0.0004
Median -0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0024 -0.0014 0.0012
Standard deviation 0.0874 0.0934 0.0831 0.0755 0.0687
Min -1.1326 -0.9844 -0.7243 -1.0965 -0.6982
Max 0.9538 3.0858 0.7071 0.7841 0.6733
Number of observations 22063 9680 13651 15243 13089
Panel B: summary for CARIS[−1; 5] by response to EA in [2;5] window
First week response 0 1 2 3 [4;33]
Mean -0.0046 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0002
Median -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0016 0.0005
Standard deviation 0.0875 0.0797 0.0799 0.0805 0.0764
Min -0.9854 -1.1326 -1.0965 -0.7558 -0.9843
Max 3.0858 0.7841 0.5694 0.9538 0.6733
Number of observations 25327 17869 10537 6276 13717
Panel C: summary for CARIS[−1; 5] by total response to EA
Total response [0;1] [2;3] [4;6] [7;10] [11;41]
Mean -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0017 -0.0023 0.0013
Median -0.0043 -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0022
Standard deviation 0.0972 0.0858 0.0771 0.0750 0.0698
Min -1.1326 -0.8360 -0.9274 -1.0965 -0.5303
Max 3.0858 0.9538 0.7841 0.5982 0.6733
Number of observations 15446 15021 17111 13631 12517
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Table 3.3: Insider sales size and analysts responsiveness to the earnings an-
nouncements
This table presents the summary on market reaction, classified by the size of transaction (percentage
over total capitalization) and analysts’ reaction during a week after the earnings announcement.
Each cell contains average cumulative abnormal return for the corresponding quintile of analysts’
reaction and quintile of share sold.
CARIS [−1; 5] is cumulative abnormal return (expressed in percentage) in the [-1;5] window where
day 0 is the day of the insider sale.
CARIS[−1; 5]
Quintile of share sold 1 2 3 4 5
Total response quintile Total
1 -0.303 -0.470 -0.485 -0.741 -0.468 -0.514
2 -0.309 -0.092 -0.474 -0.082 -1.055 -0.440
3 -0.275 -0.190 -0.124 -0.081 -0.600 -0.258
4 -0.217 -0.152 -0.103 -0.354 -0.946 -0.334
5 0.242 0.271 0.274 -0.272 -0.548 0.087
Total -0.064 -0.098 -0.146 -0.322 -0.671
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Table 3.4: Market reaction to insiders’ sales following the earnings an-
nouncement
This table presents the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is CARIS , cumulative
abnormal return in the event window around insider sale.
CARISijt = α+ β1First day responseit + β2First week responseit + β3Total analystsi(t+1)
+β4 × Cap decileit + β5Share sold+
10∑
n=1
γn × Surprise groupit
First day response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts on earnings announcement
day or on the next day; First week response is the number of analysts revising their forecasts in
the first week after earnings announcement, but not on the earnings announcement day or the next
day; Total analysts is the number of analysts covering the firm in the quarter t+ 1; Cap decile is
the capitalization decile (computed on annual basis); Share sold is the percentage of shares sold
among shares outstanding.
CARIS and Share sold are expressed in percentages.
To control for post-earnings announcement drift, I include into the model dummies for earnings
surprise group.
By the stars I denote the significance levels of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
CARIS[-1;1] CARIS[2;5] CARIS[-1;5]
First day response 0.056*** 0.072*** 0.129***
First week response 0.066*** 0.092*** 0.158***
Share sold -0.001* -0.004*** -0.005***
First day response× Share sold -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
First week response× Share sold -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Total analysts -0.028** -0.052*** -0.080***
Cap decile -0.005 -0.004 -0.009
group 1 -0.096 -0.271** -0.367**
group 2 -0.000 -0.180* -0.180
group 3 0.354*** -0.132 0.222
group 4 0.608*** 0.147 0.755***
group 5 0.796*** 0.224* 1.020***
group(-1) -0.218 0.117 -0.101
group(-2) -0.306* -0.272* -0.577**
group(-3) -0.367* 0.200 -0.167
group(-4) -0.242 0.045 -0.197
group(-5) -1.956*** -0.102 -2.057***
Constant 0.046 -0.202 -0.157
N 70947 70946 70946
Adj. R2 0.006 0.003 0.007
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Table 3.5: Market reaction to insiders’ sales following the earnings an-
nouncement: fixed-effect models.
This table presents the results of the same OLS regressions as Table 3.4, but controlling for firm
fixed effects.
The dependent variable is CARIS , cumulative abnormal return in the event window around insider
sale.
CARIS and Share sold are expressed in percentages.
Stars denote the significance levels of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
CARIS[-1;1] CARIS[2;5] CARIS[-1;5]
First day response 0.060*** 0.065*** 0.125***
First week response 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.147***
Share sold 0.003** -0.003*** -0.000
First day response× Share sold -0.020 0.007 -0.012
First week response× Share sold -0.052* -0.005 -0.057
Total analysts -0.024* -0.028** -0.052***
Cap decile -0.008 -0.078*** -0.086***
group 1 -0.059 -0.343*** -0.403**
group 2 0.142 -0.163 -0.021
group 3 0.475*** -0.130 0.345*
group 4 1.026*** 0.230* 1.255***
group 5 1.381*** 0.624*** 2.005***
group (-1) -0.123 0.024 -0.099
group (-2) -0.059 -0.260 -0.320
group (-3) -0.106 0.238 0.132
group (-4) 0.080 -0.019 0.061
group (-5) -0.574* 0.061 -0.513
Constant -0.371* 0.022 -0.349
Firm fixed effects *** *** ***
N 70946 70946 70946
Overall R2 0.0043 0.0018 0.0048
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Table 3.6: Likelihood of insiders’ sale after an earnings announcement
This table presents the results of logit regressions. The dependent variable is Insider Sale, a
dummy variables equal 1 if an insider sale happens in two weeks following an earnings announce-
ment, 0 otherwise.
P (Insider Saleit = 1) = Φ(c+ α1 ×Response dummyit + α2 × First day responseit+
α3 × First week responseit + β × Cap decileit + γ × CARE decileit
+
10∑
n=1
δn × Surprise groupit +
10∑
n=1
µn × Surprise groupit ×Response dummyit)
Response dummy is equal to one if at least one analyst revises his forecast on earnings announce-
ment day or on next day; First day response is the number of analysts who revise forecast on
earnings announcement day or on next day; First week response is the number of analysts who
revise forecast on earnings announcement during a week after announcement, but later than a
next day; Cap decile is a decile (computed for each year) of firm’s capitalization; CAREA decile
is a decile of cumulative abnormal return in the window [0;1] around earnings announcement;
Surprise group takes value from -5 to -1 for negative surprises and 1 to 5 for positive surprises.
By the stars I denote the significance levels of less than 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
CAREA decile 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079***
Cap decile 0.091*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.049***
group 1 0.580*** 0.559*** 0.606*** 0.624***
group 2 0.395*** 0.378*** 0.401*** 0.407***
group 3 0.314*** 0.308*** 0.328*** 0.319***
group 4 0.144*** 0.147*** 0.190*** 0.177***
group 5 -0.173*** -0.149*** -0.066 -0.082
group (-1) 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.353*** 0.359***
group (-2) -0.137** -0.116** 0.034 0.029
group (-3) -0.320*** -0.292*** -0.106 -0.111
group (-4) -0.571*** -0.522*** -0.387*** -0.403***
group (-5) -0.794*** -0.730*** -0.660*** -0.682***
Response dummy 0.320*** 0.420*** 0.246***
First day response 0.053***
First week response 0.038***
group1×Response dummy -0.074 -0.119
group2×Response dummy -0.040 -0.080
group3×Response dummy -0.030 -0.052
group4×Response dummy -0.063 -0.069
group5×Response dummy -0.131 -0.114
group(−1)×Response dummy -0.285*** -0.309***
group(−2)×Response dummy -0.243** -0.240**
group(−3)×Response dummy -0.321*** -0.296**
group(−4)×Response dummy -0.252* -0.218*
group(−5)×Response dummy -0.114 -0.076
Constant -1.974*** -2.098*** -2.158*** -2.083***
N 93418 93418 93418 93418
Pseudo R2 0.0475 0.0510 0.0513 0.0570
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Table 3.7: Likelihood of insiders’ sale after an earnings announcement:
Marginal effects
This table presents the marginal effects for the estimations from Table 3.6.
dy/dx
model 1 model2 model 3 model 4
CAREA decile 0.0162 0.0160 0.0159 0.0162
Cap decile 0.0187 0.0162 0.0161 0.0100
group 1* 0.1284 0.1232 0.1344 0.1386
group 2* 0.0855 0.0816 0.0869 0.0882
group 3* 0.0675 0.0659 0.0704 0.0684
group 4* 0.0301 0.0307 0.0400 0.0372
group 5* -0.0345 -0.0299 -0.0134 -0.0166
group (-1)* 0.0335 0.0344 0.0768 0.0781
group (-2)* –0.0273 -0.0231 0.0071 0.0061
group (-3)* -0.0614 -0.0563 -0.0212 -0.0223
group (-4)* -0.1035 -0.0956 -0.0731 -0.0758
group (-5)* -0.1364 -0.1271 -0.1168 -0.1200
Response dummy* 0.0647 0.0843 0.0497
First day response 0.0108
First week response 0.0078
group1×Response dummy* -0.0150 -0.0238
group2×Response dummy* -0.0080 -0.0162
group3×Response dummy* -0.0062 -0.0106
group4×Response dummy* -0.0127 -0.0140
group5×Response dummy* -0.0262 -0.0227
group(−1)×Response dummy* -0.0549 -0.0592
group(−2)×Response dummy* -0.0472 -0.0466
group(−3)×Response dummy* -0.0613 -0.0568
group(−4)×Response dummy* -0.0488 -0.0426
group(−5)×Response dummy* -0.0227 -0.0153
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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